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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the economic idea of privatization is not new, the debate on
restructuring socialist economies and privatizing has particularly intensified in the
last several years due to the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe.
There is no longer any question that crucial economic reforms are necessary
in order to transform a socialist economy from a general planning to a market-
oriented system. The decentralization of the command-administrative system is
an urgent problem faced by socialist countries. The dominance of state-
centralized property inevitably leads to the creation of state monopolies as well
as to scrupulous government control over the production, distribution, exchange
and consumption of commodities, such as existed in practice in the former Soviet
Union.
Under socialist civil law, the question of ownership is inseparably linked with
that of control. Civil law assumes that control cannot exist without ownership, as
well as that ownership cannot exist without control. Thus, the process of securi-
tization and privatization of state-owned enterprises in former socialist countries
faces a double opposition: socialists and civil law jurists alike are resistant to it.
In the past, whenever a political consensus regarding securitization and partial
privatization was almost achieved, the question of the separation of ownership
from control remained unresolved. Moreover, debate over this issue has heated
up in Russia mainly because the spontaneous nature of the privatization process
has created the opportunity for managers of state enterprises to strip the assets of
these enterprises. Employee ownership has also complicated the problem of sepa-
rating ownership from control. As a result, ownership of the stock of privatized
enterprises was diffused within the enterprises themselves without representing
a conventional right of ownership. The attempts by Russian lawyers to find
answers to all emerging problems by applying Western corporate laws did not
bring about positive results. For example, mere duplication of U.S. corporate and
trust law only worsened social conditions in the society, because it tended to more
firmly entrench managers of the enterprises in their positions as new princes. Due
to the importance of these issues, Part I of this paper discusses the concept of
control in a conventional public corporation in order to determine the extent to
which the U.S. corporate model should be adopted by Russian law.
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Part IH of this article is devoted to the legal problem of retaining some
governmental control over privatized enterprises. In this author's view, national
interest combined with the current social and political atmosphere in Russia and
other former socialist countries means that privatization should not abruptly
abrogate government control over all privatized state enterprises.! As such,
governments of socialist countries may employ various methods in order to main-
tain some control over former state-owned enterprises [hereinafter SOEs] now
undergoing privatization.2
Finally, the government might elect to let the enterprises be fully privatized
and effectuate its control over them by means of regulation, such as: establishing
certain mandatory requirements for the bylaws of the enterprises and their
corporate charters; licensing particular industrial and entrepreneurial activities;
requiring mandatory registration of the enterprises by local or central government
authorities; restricting the activity of the private joint-stock companies through
various types of securities and antitrust acts; establishing limitations on foreign
shareholding; institutionalizing government auditing and inspection services;
imposing taxes and various exactions upon the privatized enterprise; strictly en-
forcing the labor and social security laws; resolving the conflicts and disputes be-
tween enterprises through a state arbitration system; and instituting other state
regulations as may be justified for reasons of pubic interest and national
sovereignty.
It is necessary to mention, however, that in pursuing the goals of public
interest, the government's use of the rules of liability as a lash to punish un-
desirable market behavior is not the only means to which it might have recourse.
The aim of monitoring certain corporate activities might also be effectively
achieved by enacting a system of government incentives and privileges which en-
courage certain forms of desired behavior on the part of companies; this in turn
would discourage undesirable corporate behavior as the latter would lack such
government incentives and thereby become economically inefficient. Such
1. It is conceivable that the preservation of government control might be desirable in the spheres of
national defense and public services enterprises. Such has been the case for many countries all around the
world. Moreover, in certain situations, the government might want to retain some control over the enterprises
in order to: preclude the shutting down of important itrategic businesses, preserve the production lines of
enterprises that represent the national heritage, and protect employees from mass layoffs.
2. For instance, in certain situations, it is conceivable that a government might determine that, for the
sake of national interest, it should not divest itself of majority holding in enterprises that are of strategic
importance and in those that are determined to be in need of government control for various public reasons.
In other situations, the government might resort to alternative privatization techniques, such as the "golden
share," which enables the government to retain veto power over key decisions regarding the operation of a
privatized enterprise by its new owners and management after the state has become a minority shareholder or
even after a total buy-out of the enterprise from the state. In still other cases, the government might choose to
lock in its control over an enterprise during privatization through a covenant with the new owners and
managers of the enterprise. After all, considering the unreasonably low price of most of the privatized state
enterprises in some Eastern European countries and the former Soviet Union, the government is in a good
bargaining position to demand some conditions and limitations on the future operation of privatized enterprises.
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measures might include providing a broad range of various tax incentives, such
as tax holidays in free economic zones and tax breaks in industrial zones.
While these techniques are not a surrogate for government superintendence
over the management and everyday operations of the enterprises as formerly
prevailed in socialist countries, they do provide the government with effective
legal instruments for protecting the national interest and ensuring that certain
major decisions affecting the operation of the enterprises are consistent with
governmental policies. Also, the possibility of utilizing these techniques clearly
demonstrates that government does not need to fully own an enterprise in order
to accomplish its specific objectives.
Nonetheless, if the state is to act as an ordinary shareholder, the state should
be precluded from abusing the rights of other shareholders. One possible means
of preventing such abuse from arising is the concept of fiduciary duties, which to
date is unknown to Russian civil law. Fiduciary duties should be imposed on
managers and employees-(as majority shareholders) toward minority shareholders
who are often outside investors. In mixed-ownership enterprises where the state
continues to hold an equity stake (or the golden share), the law should recognize
the fiduciary duties of the state as well. The question of potential fiduciary duties
of the state is quite new in legal literature. However, due to the frequency of
partial privatization in Russia and Eastern Europe, this issue has become
increasingly pressing. Part I of this paper thus analyzes the potential fiduciary
duties of the state, whether as an ordinary shareholder or a special shareholder.
Part IV treats the problem of offering the state enterprises in trust to their
managers; a practice which has become very popular in Russia. In this author's
view, the new institution of the "company trust" confers upon managers extreme
personal powers, thereby provoking social tension, corruption and inequity
throughout the country. Moreover, trust conditions lead to arbitrary and capri-
cious management due to the undeveloped civil law regulation of these economic
relations. However, contrary to this aspect of the model of trust, which entails the
fragmentation of ownership, the aspect of trust that provides for vague, open-
ended duties of loyalty did apparently find a positive application in Russian
corporate law through the institution of fiduciary duties for directors and officers.
The practical significance of this article is in its attempts to contemplate the
model for corporate governance in Russia. This article promotes the idea that
there is a niche for the state in corporate governance in the conditions of market
economy. In this author's view, the failure of socialism in Russia and Eastern
Europe does not mean that the institution of state property is, in itself, discredited.
Privatization in these countries did not aim to abolish all means of government
influence over former state enterprises, but rather was conceived as a method of
eradicating absolute state supervision, which derived from the state's exclusive
ownership interest in the enterprises. Privatization should not be regarded as a
magical cure for the aches and pains of socialism. Privatization is not a panacea;
nor is government control a deadly disease. In this author's view, the market is
250
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more important for the efficiency of enterprises than is the private ownership of
capital. It is significantly more important for restructuring the centralized socialist
economy to establish a system of diversified property rights and to create
conditions for developing new private businesses. The state, if it desires, can also
be a player in this market. But three conditions necessarily must be fulfilled: (1)
capital markets should exist; (2) the rules of the market should be established; and
(3) all participants in the market (including the state) should play fairly. This is
a model not only for Russia, but ultimately for every country on earth. This is the
true antidote for both the dictatorship of the state and the market anarchy, both of
which are equally deleterious.
II. BUILDING A CONCEPT OF PUBLIC CORPORATION IN RUSSIA
The collapse of the wall between socialism and capitalism can be viewed as
reopening alternatives that had previously been foreclosed. Analyzing the socio-
econornic experience of both socialism and capitalism is a way of exploring these
alternatives.
Indeed, capital intensive enterprises can operate effectively only under
conditions in which there is a free flow of capital, which can be provided through
the system of capital markets. However, it is inevitable that for various political
and social reasons governments of some countries might want to retain some
control over specific enterprises. With respect to these enterprises, it is difficult
to see why it would be impermissible to allow the state to participate in the equity
of any enterprise as an ordinary shareholder. The state should not be prohibited
from buying and selling stocks on the market, provided that the government
carries the same liabilities as an ordinary shareholder or manager, including
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders, disclosure requirements, and pro-
hibitions on insider trading. However, in order to impose these and other
regulations on the state, the concepts of public corporation and corporate
governance have to be developed in Russia. This section deals with the problems
of developing the concept of public corporation in post-socialist Russia.
A. The Post-Socialist Privatization and Problems of Separation of Owner-
ship and Control
The theory of "separation of ownership and control" finds its practical imple-
mentation in the conventional public corporation in that it refers to the separation
of management functions from shareholders. The assumption is that shareholders
of large public corporations do not control the company defacto, but rather, that
control is practically vested in the managers of the corporation. Although
managerial control of large public corporations, as expressed by Richard Barber,
The Transnational Lawyer! Vol. 8
became "a crucial distinguishing characteristic of twentieth-century capitalism,"'3
the issue has become a stumbling block for the socio-economic and legal reforms
of post-socialist countries at the end of the twentieth century!
Thus, the conventional principle of separation of ownership from control
utilized in modern, capitalist-type public corporations has been rejected by post-
socialist countries. The "crucial distinguishing characteristic" of public cor-
porations and its century-long history of development was brought into question,
and reexamination of the concept of the separation of ownership from control
came from countries which did not previously have corporate entities. Accord-
ingly, the notion of the securitization of former state enterprises was opposed by
both socialists and conservative civil law scholars.
1. Socialist Ideology and Problems of Separation of Ownership from
Control
According to socialist ideology, the concept of separation of ownership from
control is inadmissible in a Soviet-type society. Socialists are unable to reconcile
themselves with the idea of alienated labor, which according to Karl Marx
reduces workers to slaves of capital, estranged from the product of their labor and
from their life activity because they are forced to work for the means of subsis-
tence rather than for their self-satisfaction and self-realization.5 As an immediate
consequence of the alienation of workers from the product of their labor, Marx
saw the estrangement of human beings from each other, which in turn leads to an
inevitable separation of society into classes of property owners and propertyless
workers. Socialists stress Marx's conclusion that exploitative relations inevitably
provoke irreconcilable class contradictions and social tensions,6 which are
undesirable in a democratic society.
Indeed, employees in a typical capitalist enterprise have a fixed claim to a
salary and are obliged to accede to the control of the owners. In addition, em-
ployees have no interest in control, because control is associated with risk, which
is in turn identified with ownership and ownership alone. Propertyless employees
are discouraged from bearing the risk of an enterprise over which they have no
control; and they cannot have control without possessing equity in the enterprise,
which they cannot afford. The employees' most valuable asset is their labor
3. RiCHARD J. BARBE, TE AMmcAN CORPORAoN: ITs POWER, iS MONEY, rS POLCS 54 (E.P.
Dutton 1970).
4. For example, what is control and who, in fact, should control a public corporation? What is the
interrelation and interdependence between ownership and control? If "control" is a necessary stick in the
bundle of civil law property rights, how can ownership be separated from control? These questions, which
might seem simple to U.S. and Western scholars, are troublesome for socialist civil law lawyers.
5. On Marx's ideas of the "objectification" and "estrangement" of labor, see Karl Marx, Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, THE MARX-ENGELS READER (R.C. Tucker ed., 1972).
6. Id.
%, 252
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which they sell to capitalist-owners on the labor market. If the owners of the
enterprise exercise their control unwisely and the firm is forced out of business,
the employees lose their jobs. Even though it is presumed that they will find
another job on the market, because employees' tasks within a firm occasionally
compel them to develop specific skills, their employment with this particular firm
might be more valuable to them than employment with another firm. In other
words, because of risk of unemployment, employees can be expected to insist on
a share of control or upon some guarantee of security from that risk. However,
owners are usually unwilling to give employees such guarantees! Ultimately,
employees in the capitalist world can be terminated at will for any cause, as long
as the cause is not clearly abusive, oppressive or discriminatory, thereby violating
public policy.
In contrast, according to official Soviet ideology, labor is not viewed as a
commodity! Workers are not exploited, since there is no private capital and the
Soviet state, being "the state of the whole people," is not considered an employer.
Although workers, being the theoretical owners of all national property, do not
have a residual claim on the assets of their enterprise, they do have significant
monitoring powers over the management of the enterprise.
Arguably, the notion of "the property of the whole people" was partially
realized inside state enterprises. Public organizations and labor collectives directly
participated in the management of their enterprises. "It is no exaggeration to say
that public organizations take part in solving every major problem in the work of
the enterprise and the life of its collective," 9 wrote Khalfina. Indeed, trade union
committees, jointly with the management, decided questions regarding internal
labor regulations, estimates for use of the enterprise's funds, payment of bonuses,
and allocation of apartments in houses owned by the enterprise. Although
workers did not have a residual claim on assets of the enterprise, they had explicit
powers within the enterprise's internal decision-making process. These powers
included the rights: (1) to independently determine how to utilize net profit; (2)
to participate in distribution of the net profit; (3) to establish policy for com-
pensation and define their own salary; (4) to elect the council (or board) of the
enterprise; (5) to elect the director of the enterprise and his immediate supervisor
(brigadir); and (6) other powers necessary to effectuate their self-managing
function. 0 Management reported to trade union committee meetings on draft
7. Dahl has concluded that capitalist democracy is equivalent to political democracy, but not work-
place democracy. RoBERTDARL, PREFACETO ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1985).
8. The difference between capitalism and socialism is the hiring relationship: capital hiring labor vs.
labor hiring capital. Thus, it has been maintained that the essence of capitalism is neither private property nor
free markets but the legal relationship wherein capital hires labor rather than the reverse.
9. R. KHALFKNA, STATE PROPERTY iN THE USSR 137 (Progress ed., Moscow 1980).
10. LAw ON ENTEtURisE IN THE USSR, adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, June 4, 1990,
Vedomosti SND SSSR, No. 25, Item 460, translated in W.E. BttLER, BASIC LEGAL DOCUMENTS OFTHE
RUSSIAN FEDERATiON 30119 (W.E. Butler trans. and ed., Oceana Publications Inc., 1992).
The Transnational Lawyer Vol. 8
plans, on the results of production and on measures to improve working con-
ditions and "to provide better everyday and cultural services for industrial and
office workers.""1
In apprehension of the de-socialization of SOEs and the diminution of wor-
kers' influence inside privatized enterprises, the socialists opposed the new move-
ment of mass privatization but ardently supported proposals for leasing SOEs to
labor collectives, in order to retain employee ownership and government control.
Undoubtedly, the lobbying efforts of socialists and trade unions predetermined
the development of the privatization process in Russia.
During privatization, every Russian citizen received a free privatization
voucher of equal nominal value,'2 which could be used to buy shares in privatized
state enterprises which initially could not be bought with anything else but
vouchers. As a result, the largest part of state assets, or eighty percent of federal
property and forty-five percent of municipal property, were sold to private owners
for privatization vouchers.'
3
The roots of "voucher privatization" are planted in socialist ground. Under
socialism the state is not considered to be the owner of state enterprises; instead
the state acts simply as an administrator, while the community as a whole acts as
the ultimate owner. Academician A.B. Venedictov, a founder of the legal theory
of socialist state property, stated that the united and sole subject of the right of
state socialist ownership is the whole public community, organized as the state.14
The legal form of the "whole people's property" was adopted by the Constitutions
and civil legislation of the former Soviet Union and other socialist countries.' 5
Since the community was regarded as the owner, there were logical arguments in
favor of free distribution on an equitabl~basis on the ground that the property had
already been paid for by the population. 6 Thus, many former socialist countries,
11. KHALFINA, supra note 9.
12. Edict Enacting Russian Federation System of Privatization Vouchers, Statute of Privatization
Vouchers, The Russian Federation President's Edict No. 914, art. 2, Aug. 14, 1992.
13. S. Viktorov, Pravitelstvopostavilo na vaucher [The Government Bet on Voucher] KOMMERSANT,
Jan. 27, 1993, at 9.
14. V.A. VENEwicrov, GOSSuDARsrWvENNAA SoBsTvENNosT [STATE SOCIALIST PROPERTY]
(Academija Nauk ed., 1948).
15. Under Yugoslavia's model of"social" property, no one in particular had property rights to the assets
of a state enterprise, which officially belonged to the whole society. The system of self-management, which
was introduced in the early 1950s, gave workers the right to decide on a broad spectrum of policies regarding
their enterprise, including the distribution of enterprise income, the determination of workers' wages and
premiums, the establishment of the amount of accumulation of capital, and questions regarding internal
investments. However, the workers themselves were never granted full property rights; instead they were
considered agents of society as a whole. See, e.g., Milica Uvalic, Privatization in Disintegrating East European
States: The Case of Former Yugoslavia 1, 3 (EUI Working Paper RSC No. 94111, 1994) (Robert Schuman
Centered., Eur. U. Inst., Florence, Italy).
16. Workers in socialist countries felt that they were the "owners" of their finns, at least with regard
to that part of their income they reinvested in the enterprise's assets during the course of self-management. See,
e.g., A. Bat, Property in Capital and in the Means of Production in Socialist Economies, XI J. L. & EcON. 1-4
254
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such as the Czech and Slovak Republics, Romania, Russia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine,
Lithuania, and Estonia, utilized the so-called "give-away scheme" of privati-
zation, which did not generate any revenue for the state. The governments of
these countries gratuitously issued to all their citizens compensation vouchers,
ownership certificates, privatization checks, and certificates of investment or
similar types of investment coupons enabling the citizens to buy shares of
privatized enterprises. 7
Moreover, a lion's share of the privatized enterprises was given to their
employees. Russian law provides the following advantages as incentives to
organizing labor collectives for purchasing privatized enterprises: (1) the right to
organize into business associations in order to enter into purchase agreements
with the state regarding the enterprise; (2) the preferential right to purchase the
enterprise, including the right of "first bid," the right to buy a controlling interest,
the right to buy the enterprise for a reduced price and the right to other discounts;
(3) some favorable terms for administrative officers of the enterprise; and (4) the
right to use profits from the enterprise as a part of the purchase price. 8
To illustrate, the Russian Government created a privatization system that
allows employees of large enterprises to choose one of three options for privati-
zation. The first of these options provides for twenty-five percent employee
ownership of the preferred non-voting shares at no charge, with the additional
right to buy ten percent of the common stock at a discount of thirty percent of par
value. Under this option, managers and administrative officers of the enterprise
have the right to buy five percent of the common stock, on favorable terms, which
might include a reduced price. The second option allows employees to buy up to
fifty-one percent of the shares (a controlling interest in the corporation) at 1.7
times their par value. The remaining shares must be sold through a voucher
auction or tender. Finally, the third option offers the employees twenty percent
ownership in mainly bankrupt firms, restructured at face value, and an additional
twenty percent ownership on preferential terms. This option pertains only to
enterprises having more than 200 employees and assets between 1 million and 50
million rubles as of January 1, 1992.19 All three options provide employees the
significant opportunity to convert their preferred stock into common stock with
(1968); Uvalic, supra note 15. at 2-8.
17. See, e.g., Renzo Daviddi, Privatizarion in the Transition to a Market Economy 1, 31 (EUI Working
Paper RSC No. 94115, 1994) (Robert Schuman Centered., Eur. U. Inst., Florence, Italy).
18. The privatization laws of other former Soviet Republics grant almost identical rights and privileges
to labor collectives for purchasing the privatized enterprises. See, e.g., Christine M. Grzesiak, The
Denationalization of Kazakhstan. 21 DENV.3. INTLL. & PoL'Y 441,450 (1993) (discussing the rights of labor
collectives to participate in privatization according to The Denationalization Law of Kazakhstan).
19. According to Kommersant, labor collectives, as a rule, are expected to prefer to acquire a controlling
interest in a corporation: 77.4% of enterprises were privatized using the second option of employee
privatization; 21.2% through the first option; and only 78 enterprises (1.4%) were privatized through the third
option. Krugooborot vauchera v prirode, 27 KommmAsAN, July 5, 1993, at 16.
255
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voting rights. A labor collective also has the right to establish a special Joint
Stock Fund of Employees of the Enterprise (FARP) with a volume of five to ten
percent ownership. Stocks of the FARP must be given away to employees either
at no charge or at a reduced price.
Clearly this employee privatization system reflects Russian social politics.
However, there are some obvious problems with these forms of employee
privatization. First, there is a question of equity and fairness since this type of
asset transfer benefits only a limited segment of the population-privileged
citizens who currently hold jobs in the largest firms. Second, these models of pri-
vatization sharply limit new public investment in enterprises and distort the
secondary sale of stocks on the market. They have aggravated the investment
climate and imposed various obstacles to foreign participation in Russian privati-
zation.' The third problem concerns the efficiency of self-managed enterprises.
Some economists believe that such enterprises tend to "underinvest and have
shorter planning horizons." 21 Another argument against self-management is that
there are high costs associated with collective decision-making by workers.
22
Since workers could curtail dividend payments by increasing salaries and pur-
suing other non-pecuniary interests at the expense of the corporation, it is difficult
to attract private investors willing to acquire a minority stake in a worker-con-
trolled enterprise. Also, the fact that employees own a significant block of shares
in the privatized enterprise precludes managers from firing them, despite the
substantial over-employment that exists in most Russian enterprises. The impos-
sibility of reducing the labor force causes slow growth of worker salaries, which
in turn leads to a loss of the most highly skilled employees who inevitably leave
to go into business for themselves.
Given the existing socio-political situation in Russia, it might be advisable for
Russian legislators to explore the German experience in corporate law, parti-
cularly with regard to employee monitoring power. It is evident that participation
of German workers in the corporate affairs of their enterprises was institu-
tionalized under the influence of the socialist movement, historically very strong
in Germany.?
20. See, e.g., Foreign Participation in Russian Privatization Must Deal With Various Obstacles, 3
RussIA & CoMmoNwEALra Bus. L. REP. No. 21, March 9, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld
File.
21. EDuARDoBoREzszrmN&MANmOHANS. KumAR, 38 PROPOSALS FOR PRIVATIZATION IN EASR
EuROPE 315 (1991) (on file with International Monetary Fund).
22. Henry Hansmann, When Does Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Law Finns, Codeterminatlon,
and Economic Democracy, 99 YALELJ. 1749, 1779-96 (1990).
23. Theodor Baums indicates that the dual board system, which later gave workers rights to participate
in'the election of a supervisory board, was established in 1870, in Marx's time, although Baums did not
specifically state (and in my private conversation with him denied) that it was under Marx's influence.
Nonetheless, the working class in Germany was historically very strong, and the influence ofsocialist ideology,
including that of Marx, Engels. Kautsky and others, was enormous. See Theodor Baums, Corporate
Governance in Germany: System and Recent Developments, in AsPErs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 12
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Currently, German workers do not have an ownership interest in the
corporation, but rather a right to participate in the election of members of a
supervisory board (Aufsichtstrat), which appoints and dismisses the management
board (Vorstang) of a corporation.24 According to the German Law on Codeter-
mination (Mitbestimmungsgesetz), in corporations with more than 2000 em-
ployees (1000 in the coal-and-steel industry), half of the supervisory board has
to be elected by the company's workers; the other half is chosen at the share-
holders' meeting.25 For instance, half of the twenty members of the Supervisory
Board of the German Corporation Siemens Aktiengesellschaft are elected by the
workers of the enterprise. In 1990, 583,000 shareholders elected only ten mem-
bers of the Siemens supervisory board, while 402,000 employees elected the other
ten members (including three members that were elected by the labor union of the
enterprise)2 6
Under German law, a supervisory board has certain controlling and moni-
toring functions: (1) the supervision of management; (2) the appointment of the
members of the managing board and, if there is good cause, their dismissal; (3)
the right to examine the company's documents and assets (annual reports, balance
sheets, etc.) and receive other comprehensive information; (4) the right to
question managers; (5) the right to call shareholder meetings; and (6) the right to
approve certain important transactions. 7 Thus, German workers through the
supervisory board have a strong indirect influence on corporate policy.
The German two-tier or dual boards system reveals a possible alternative
form of employee participation in corporate monitoring without the necessity of
allotting them special ownership stock, which would eliminate both the concern
of socialists over the alienation of labor and the deficiencies of the employee
ownership scheme introduced in Russia. Certainly the German experience is
similar to the Soviet workers' rights of "full economic control" and "operative
management," which provided Soviet workers with broad powers to participate
in the management of their own enterprise. The difference, however, is sub-
stantial: whereas German enterprises are securitized and privately owned, Soviet
enterprises were state-owned entities operating under a "soft-budget constraint,"2
without any exposure to capital markets.
Because of expectations of soft subsidies (open-ended), soft taxation (easily
adjustable), soft credit (easily obtainable and renegotiable with a possibility of
(Mats Isaksson & Rolf Skog eds., 1994).
24. See Baums, supra note 23, at 12-14.
25. Manfred Perlitz & Frank Seger, The Role of Universal Banks in German Corporate Governance,
4 Bus. &THE CONTEmP. WORLD 54 (1994).
26. Baurns, supra note 23, at 14.
27. See, e.g., Perlitz & Seger, supra note 25, at 53; see also Baums, supra note 23, at 12.
28. The term "soft budget constraint" was introduced by Janos Kornai. See Janos Kornai, The Soft
Budget Constraint 39(1) KuKILOs 3-30 (1986).
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having the debt forgiven) and soft prices (calculated on a cost-plus basis),29
managers of Soviet-type state enterprises failed to take seriously any instructions
from the center3 An adequate monitoring mechanism did not exist. Financial
control of firms by the center thereby became impossible, as managers did not
respect any announced prices, taxes, or plans. Besides, the managers could always
explain their bad management by citing their restricted autonomy and limited
authority to exercise managerial power. Absence of a reserve army of unem-
ployed, extensive employment rights and chronic shortages of labor made it
virtually impossible for managers to control relations in production'
Clearly, state enterprises should.be restructured and securitized. Without
securitization, even if state enterprises enjoy full autonomy and markets are
substantially liberalized, the state still will not be able to effectively supervise
management; nor will this situation resolve the problem of information supply.
So far, the best known objective method used to judge management performance
is the valuation of enterprises via a stock market. Stock markets pressure a firm
to be efficient, since the threat of takeover is continuously an issue. However, the
operation of an efficient stock market requires that ownership of the enterprises
be transferable. In other words, the enterprises themselves have to be owned by
someone. Generally, a workers's claim on a firm's profits or assets is not trans-
ferable; the claim is contingent on maintaining the status of employee. In a case
where ownership is not transferable (non-traded stocks), capital market pressure
is much weaker than it would be if the stocks were publicly traded.
Although there are many alternative devices of external and internal
monitoring, issuance of shares seems to be a prerequisite. Neither a capital market
system nor the German and Japanese bank-centered system can overcome the
problem of the absence of ascertainable transferable ownership of the enterprise. 32
Centralized, fully government-owned institutions cannot overcome the infor-
mation problem, which includes insufficient means of estimating demand for
existing products and deciding the direction of investments to meet demand for
product innovation. The decentralized market system, where information is
exchanged through the price system, is evidently more efficient in meeting the
demands of any economic unit, whether these be banks, mutual funds, pension
funds or Wall Street brokers and speculators.
29. See il (discussing the term soft budget constraint).
30. "Center" refers to the ministry or central plan agency administrating the centralized economy.
31. See, e.g., RUDOLF BAuRO, THE ALTERNATIwE IN EASTERN EUROPE 207-10 (Verso Books ed.,
London 1976); WALTERD. CONNOR, THE AccDTALPRoLuARuTch. 5 (Princeton University Press 1991):
M. Holubenko, The Soviet Working Class, 4 CRIrIQUE 5-26 (1975).*
32. See, e.g., Christian Harm, The Relationship Between German Banks and Large German Firms,
(County Econ. Dep't, The World Bank, Policy Research Working Papers. May 1992) (describing bank-oriented
systems as an alternative to capital markets monitoring devices); see also TIIEODOR BAUMs, THE GERMAN
BANKING SYSTEM AND ITS IMPAC7S ON CORPORATE FINANCE AND GOVERNANCE (Arbeitspapiere, 1993);
George . Benson, Universal Banking 8(3) . ECoN.E .RsP. 121-43 (1994).
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As for the socialist notion of employees' stake in the economy, this might be
achieved through a whole range of various alternatives, including the German-
type supervisory board, mutual and pension funds, Employee Stock Option Plans
(ESOPs), 33 Chinese-type town and village enterprises,34 Mondragon worker
cooperatives, 35 and other varieties of the worldwide experience of worker control
in capitalist industry.6 These forms of workplace democracy and ownership
symbolize the main feature of a future post-capitalist society, which Drucker has
called "capitalism without capitalists."37
Thus, the main conclusion that should be reached is that there is nothing anti-
socialist or anti-Marxist in the securitization and privatization of former SOEs.
These reforms are crucial and urgent. Marx, himself, viewed public corporations
as "capital, which is inherently based on a social mode of production and pre-
supposes a social concentration of means of production and labor power.'
Interestingly enough, this statement by Marx was used by communist opponents
in China, who tried to disarm the supporters of state property by arguing that the
share system is a form by which capital becomes the property of the organized
working people.3 9 For instance, Tong Dalin, a well-known economist in China,
presented Marx's statement as the "theoretical starting point for securitization of
State Owned Enterprises in a socialist country.
' 4
Moreover, read thoroughly, Marx condemned the idea of SOEs when he
cautioned socialists about turning society into "an abstract capitalist."4' The con-
tinued existence of wage labor in socialist societies is a prima facie indication of
the ignorance of Marx and marxism. In a sense, a capitalist public corporation
with employee equity participation through mutual and pension funds is more of
a socialist institution than an SOE, which is managed by government bureaucrats
through the alienation of labor. In his early book The Unseen Revolution, Peter
Drucker remarked that if "socialism" is rigorously defined as "ownership of the
means of production by the workers," then the United States is the first truly
33. See, e.g., Hansmann, supra note 22.
34. See, e.g., JoHN RoEmER, AFUTuRFORSoclisM 127-28 (1994).
35. See, e.g.. H. THoMAS &C LoGANMoND RAGoNPRoDUCERCoOPERATiVES (1980); R. OAKESHoT,
THE CASE FOR WORKERS' Co-ops (1978).
36. See, e.g., DAVrD P. ELLERMAN. THEDEMOCRAICWORER-OWNEDFiRM: ANEW MODELFORTHE
WESrAD EAST (1990); William Simon, The Politics of "Cooperation" in the Workplace RECONSTRUCTION,
No. 1, 18 (Winter 1990); JAROSLAV VANEK, THE LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMY (1977); MURAT R. SERTEL
WORKERS AND INCEsrV (1988); see also Dorothy Sue Cobble, Organizing the Post-Industrial Workforce:
Lessons from the History of Waitress Unionism, 44 INDUS. AND LAD. RELREV., No. 3 (Apr. 1991).*
37. PEM F. DRUCKER, POST-CArTALisTSOCIETY 74 (Harper Business 1994).
38. 3 KALM CAPITAL 567(l981).
39. See, eg., T. Dalin, Securitization Is a New Start ng Point of Socialist Enterprises, PEOp'ivs DAILY,
Aug. 18, 1986. at 2, cited in Jianfu Chen, Securitization of State.owned Enterprises and the Ownership
Controversy in the PRC, 15 SYDNEYL. REv. 59,67 (1993).
40. See Dalin, supra note 39.
41. Marx, supra note 5, § Estranged Labor.
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"socialist" society. Drucker alleges that the dominant position of pension funds
in the U.S. economy is "what Socialist theory calls the 'command position' of the
economy; whoever controls them is in command of the rest." 42"Let contemporary
'Marxist' rulers label their societies as they wish, nonetheless a system of wage
labor and coerced division of labor [in the SOEs] is, for Marx, undergirded by
capital, even if in a mutant form; and capital, mutant or pure, stunts, twists, and
suppresses individuality," wrote Peter Stillman
4 3
However, by no means does this article deny the regulative role of the state
in a democratic economy. Nor does it advocate an Epsteinian-type minimal state
with minimal functions. Quite the contrary, this article advocates that the role of
the state in the national economy might be more than trivial, particularly if the
political and social atmosphere in the country dictate it. For instance, the state
might retain certain shares of privatized enterprises as an ordinary or special
shareholder. But it is very important to understand that the ideological disputes
regarding the role of the state should be distinct from the question of whether or
not to securitize SOEs. The answer should be clear to everyone: securitize. There-
fore, all ideological debates will be related only to questions of degree: when to
privatize, what to privatize and how to privatize.
2. Civil Law Tradition and Problems of Separation of Ownership
From Control
Socialist civil law lawyers also oppose securitization because it is based on
a legal separation of ownership from control. Such separation purportedly trans-
mutes the logic of traditional civil law property rights based on the principle of
"one thing-one owner."" Control, defined as the power to exercise authoritative
or dominating influence over a thing, has been an eccentric stick in the bundle of
civil law property rights throughout the history of the continental law system
(which derived from ancient Roman law). For instance, the classical Roman jurist
Justinian determined "ownership" to be "plena in re potestas," meaning "a
plenum of power of the master over his property," or, in a modem interpretation,
the "full domination by the owner."45 In civil law, this "full domination" was not
42. PErRF.DRUCKERTHEUNSEEREvOLUTION 1-2(1976).
43. Peter G. Stillman, Property, Freedom; and Individuality in Hegel's and Marx's Political Thought.
NOMOS XXII: PRoPERTY 161 (1980).
44. 'This principle does not really assume that there must be only one owner of a thing, but it presumes
the unity of the bundle of ownership rights of a single owner, which traditionally included the rights to possess,
use and dispose. In other words, although civil law lawyers accepted the idea that several people might own
one thing by sharing the rights to possess, use and dispose of property without the separation of these rights,
they did not accept the notion of separating the right to possess from the right to use or dispose. They did not
recognize the Anglo-American concepts of estates, equitable title, or trust. They ardently opposed dividing the
single ownership right into different functions among various people.
45. SeeJ. INsT. 1.9.12; DIG. 2.1.13.1; DIG. 14.1.
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legally divisible into separate estates, nor could equitable title be separated from
legal title to the same thing. The traditional trouble spot for civil law jurists
regarding the legal splintering of the ownership bundle into separate sticks was
inherited by socialist lawyers, who actually raised the civil law concept of
undivided property rights onto the pedestal of socialist ideological dogma under
the accompaniment of the Marxist theory of alienated labor.
46
The most disturbing issue for civil law lawyers and communists alike was the
issue of the great power of managers combined with the powers of shareholders
in a public corporation. As Berle and Means remarked, "the concentration of eco-
nomic power separate from ownership has, in fact, created economic empires, and
has delivered these empires into the hands of a new form of absolutism,
relegating 'owners' to the position of those who supply the means whereby the
new princes may exercise their power."47 The civilians could not accept the notion
that shareholders, being the de jure owners of the corporation, do not possess de
facto rights to control and monitor managers who are, legally, simply their agents.
To illustrate how the ideological and civil law obstacles work in real life, take
the example of the securitization of Chinese SOEs,48 opposed by both com-
munists and civil law scholars. In fact, the securitization (gufenhua) of SOEs
sparked the greatest controversy among all economic reform measures that have
ever been introduced in China.49 The centerpiece of the conflict was the sepa-
ration of ownership from control, which generated considerable discussion in
Chinese legal and economic literature in the 1990s0 Many scholars believed that
the introduction of a joint-stock company system (gufenzhi) would change the
nature and content of the civil law property rights system.51 Chinese civil law
scholars were troubled by the idea that control over an enterprise might legally
be separated from ownership of the enterprise, which is inconsistent with the civil
law notion of "one thing-one owner."52 They argued that shareholding would
"delineate ownership rights," which was unacceptable from a civil law point of
46. Nonetheless. the socialist states did not absorb Marx's idea of individuality nor Marx's precautions
against wage labor in communist society. After abolishing private property and retaining wage labor, these
states came to fill the role of an "abstract capitalist' which was explicitly condemned by Marx. See, ag.,
MARX. supra note 5; see also Stillman, supra note 43, at 130-31, 161.
47. ADOL BEmRLJR. &G. MEANS,TEMODERNCORPORATION AND PRIVATEPROPERTY 124 (1932).
48. "Corporatization" in this paper refers to the legal reform measure which was the first stage of
privatization of the state-owned enterprises through which property in the enterprises was divided into shares
and prepared for sale to the public. In some literature, authors use the terms "securitization" or
"commercialization:' which are generally identical to the meaning of the term "corporatization:'
49. Jianfu, supra note 39, at 60.
50. See generally Jianfu, supra note 39, at 59-85.
51. See generally Jianfu, supra note 39, at 60.
52. See Jianfu, supra note 39, at 75 cited in Sun Zhiping, On the Property Right of Capitalist Joint-
Stock Companies, 3ZHENGFALuNTAN (J.CHiNAUNVERSTYOFPOL. Sc. &L.) 60-65 (1988); see also Sun
Zhiping, Re-thinking on Property Relations of Shares and Stock Companies, 3 ZHONGGUO FAXUE
(JuRISpRUDENcE IN CINA) 14-18 (1988).
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view.53 The Chinese scholar Sun Zhiping and others insisted on upholding the
centuries-long civil law notions that there could be only one owner of one thing,
and that ownership rights must be both independent and exclusive! 4 Not sur-
prisingly, the other major force precluding implementation of a share system into
Chinese civil law was the ideological resistance of the socialists, who could not
be reconciled to the possibility of forfeiting governmental control over SOEs.
In this theoretical debate over separation of ownership from control, signified
by securitization, the proponents of economic reforms in China had to persuade
both the communists and the civilians. As such, in some cases a persuasive argu-
ment failed because it did not pass the two-tiered test of both the communists and
the civilians. On one hand, arguments that the state could retain a substantial
dominant position in the national economy without necessarily holding 100
percent of the property of a single state enterprise and that the state might be a co-
owner with the workers (laodong gongyouzhi) consistent with Marx's principles
of socialism, were rejected by civil law scholars, who insisted that there was no
way to divide an enterprise into shares "so that one worker owns a blast furnace
and another owns a steel rolling machine."' 5 On the other hand, arguments that
if the new model of compound-structural ownership does not fit into the civil law
system it is still possible to create a new concept of ownership by changing the
civil law, were rebutted by ideological socialists. The socialists maintained that
SOEs by their very nature require state control and sensible intervention.
Both civil law dogmatists and hard-core communists welcomed Berle and
Means's comments that the "traditional logic of property" and the "traditional
logic of profit' are distorted in a capitalist corporation.57 They frequently cited the
following passage from Berle: "Essentially these stockholders, though still
politely called 'owners,' are passive. They have the right to receive only. The
conditions of their being is that they do not interfere in management.5 8
However, socialists and civilians cited this excerpt for different purposes.
While socialists emphasized the diminution of the rights of workers and the
creation of a new class of capitalist-exploiters, civilians underlined the idea of
separation of ownership from control as unacceptable to them because of its
general incompatibility with the theory of civil law.
53. 1. Yiwei, Research Into a New Type of Socialist Public Ownership, PEOPL.'s DAILY, Mar. 30,1987,
at 5, cited in Jianfu, supra note 39, at 68.
54. Zhiping, On the Property Rights of Capitalist Joint-Stock Companies, supra note 52, at 60, cited
in Jianfu, supra note 39, at 75.
55. Jianfu, supra note 39, at 68-69 (citing Ma Bin & Hong Zhunyan. Enlivening Large State
Enterprises: Where is the Motive Force?).
56. Jianft, supra note 39, at 59-85.
57. BERLE& MEANs., supra note 47, at 293-98,299-302; see also Jianfu, supra note 39, at 76,77.
58. BERLE, POWER wITouT PRoPERTY: ANEw DEVELOPMENT N AMERICAN POLTICAL ECONOMY
74(1959).
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Nonetheless, in this author's view, the idea of separation of ownership from
control in the corporate context is not as contrary to the civil law system as is
often supposed. The solution to the problem lies in distinguishing ownership of
the assets of the corporation from ownership of the shares of the corporation. It
is well settled that, as a matter of law, a shareholder of a corporation (even a sole
shareholder) does not own the assets of the company (which belong to the cor-
poration), but instead owns only shares of the corporation's stock.5 9
The idea of the reification of a corporation as a separate legal entity is well
recognized not only in common law countries, but in civil law capitalist countries
as well. But the theory of reification of a corporation as a legal entity was not
always recognized in civil law. In early nineteenth century Germany, legal
scholars, along with official jurisprudence, viewed corporations as predicated
upon a contract among the shareholders, and maintained that these shareholders
should be considered the true owners of the company's assets.o For instance,
prominent nineteenth-century legal scholar Friedreich Carl von Savigny treated
a corporation as similar to a partnership (Sozietat) whereby shareholders, like
partners, would be co-owners.61 Certainly, had this doctrine not been abandoned
after the First World War, it could have had significant legal consequences on
German corporate law, such as abolishing the limited liability of shareholders and
affecting concepts of the contractual duty of fairness between shareholders and
the fiduciary duties of managers. Undoubtedly, this doctrine would have limited
managerial discretion and strengthened the status of shareholders. This notion of
"true co-owners' 62 was apparently abandoned for the same socio-political reasons
that gave rise to the German concept of "codetermination," which provides em-
ployees with broad rights in corporate governance. Arguably, German legislators,
frightened by the revolutionary movement in Europe and Russia, tried to prevent
the division of society into classes of "true owners" and propertyless workers.
Although a corporation is universally recognized as a separate legal entity,
the consequences of the concept of reification are more important for civil law
countries than for those that follow the common law63 because civil law suffers
from what Max Weber called "logically formal rationalism." 4 This means that
civil law, emphasizing systematic values, tends to operate with a great number of
59. See, e.g.,WILuAMA. KLEaJOHN C. COFFE JR., Busmns ORGANrATIONAND FINANCE LEGAL
AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 106-10 (5th ed. 1993).
60. See Baums, supra note 23, at 10.
61. See Baums, supra note 23, at 10.
62. For the legal doctrine of the position of managers as "mandataries of the shareholders, see BAUMs,
DER GESCHAFMLEEMVERTRAG 66 (1987). cited in Baums, supra note 23, at 27.
63. Klein and Coffee remark that the common law lawyer should not be deluded by the illusion of
reification, though it is sometimes "a helpful shorthand form of expression:' KLEN & COFFEE. supra note 59,
at 109-10.
64. JOHN H. MERRYMAN, DAvID S. CLARK, JOHN 0. HALEY, THE CItyL LAW TRADMON: EUROPF,
LATIN AMERICA, AND EASTERN AStA 483 (1994).
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legal concepts, definitions and classifications. The legal scientists of civil law
countries are more interested in developing and elaborating a theoretical scientific
structure of the legal system than in solving concrete problems.65 This "con-
ceptualjurisprudence ' creates certain technical problems that are not confronted
by common law lawyers, for example, the problem of how to define the legal title
of shareholders, corporations, employees and managers rather than of how to
divide functions and authority among the parties of the same enterprise. As such,
the theory of "legal entity" or 'juridical person" helps resolve the problem of
separating legal titles without splitting ownership into segregated parts.
Furthermore, and this is very important to understand, the problems of
conceptualization in civil law became even more severe during the reformation
of former socialist countries, which, because of their ideological commitment,
have adhered more strictly to the civil law tradition. Moreover, the more a
country was subjected to communist influence, the more hostile an attitude was
developed toward securitization and separation of ownership from control. This
is why a whole spectrum of legal theories was invoked in China, for instance, to
justify securitization as compared to relatively few conventional techniques for
justification in Eastern Europe. For example, in order to justify dividing the SOEs
into shares, Chinese scholars offered at least four concepts: (1) the "theory of
legal person's ownership" (faren suoyouquan shuo); (2) the "theory of dual
ownership" (shuangchong suoyouquan shuo); (3) the "theory of shareholder's
ownership" (gudong suoyouquan shuo); and (4) the theory of preserving the
status quo based on the rejection of all ownership theories.5
Likewise, the influence of civil law is apparent in the many important
questions that have arisen as a result of the legal and economic reforms in Russia.
Such as questions of fiduciary duties, employee participation in corporate affairs,
managerial authority, government control over the privatized enterprises, the
definition of stocks and securities, and the determination of corporate structure.
Russian civil law lawyers tried to create concepts which would logically fit into
the legal framework established by the Russian civil law system for each of these
problems. But at the center of this discussion is the question of the legal essence
of the joint-stock company.
Russian scholars and Russian legislation provide different and contradictory
approaches to the legal structure of a public corporation, termed a joint-stock
company (akzionernoe obzhestvo). For instance, according to the Law On Owner-
ship in the RSFSR (1990), joint-stock companies, as opposed to shareholders, are
65. As John Henry Merryman expressed it, "legal science is a creation of the professors-it smells of
the lamp-and our judge-dominated [common] law is fundamentally inhospitable to it." Id. at 485.
66. Since communication between lawyers and interpretation of statutes becomes difficult without
concepts and definitions, civil law tends to give more weight to the technical side of the law, that is. to the
stipulation of what is what in the law's language.
67. Jianfu, supra note 39, at70-76.
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considered to be the owners of assets received by the companies from the sale of
stocks.68 This theory adequately reflects the modem world view of a corporation
as a separate legal entity, which justifies the legal provision of limited shareholder
liability. Nonetheless, another, more recent Russian Law On Enterprises and
Entrepreneurial Activity (1991) adopts Savigny's doctrine of a stock corporation
as a partnership, where the shareholders are co-owners. 69 Although this law does
not reject the concept of limited liability, it expressly pronounces that assets of a
corporation belong to its shareholders by right of common share ownership. 0
Thus, limited liability of shareholders was secured not by the Western concept of
separated ownership but through the classical civil law doctrine of the 'jurldical
person," which was traditionally applied to Soviet enterprises in order to reflect
their autonomous status. t Under the old Soviet law, even SOEs were considered
juridical persons which were not liable for the obligations of the State and its
agencies? 2
The Statute On Joint-Stock Societies (1991) defines a stock as "a security
issued by a joint-stock society and certifying the right of ownership of a share in
the capital of the society, as specified in its charter."73 Thus, under Russian law,
stock represents an ownership right rather than a participatory right in a cor-
poration. However, one might ask what difference does it make how the law
determines who is the owner of the corporation so long as the shareholders are
provided by law with a limited liability status. The difference is substantial in
civil law. There are two types of subjective rights that are recognized by civil law:
absolute rights (property rights and rights to a thing) and relative rights
(contractual obligations and torts). While the former are protected by the legal
rules of property rights, the latter are regulated by tort and contract rules. In other
words, absolute and relative rights trigger the application of different sections of
the Civil Code.
68. LAWON OwNERSHIPN mRSFSR, adopted by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, Dec. 24, 1990, arts.
14, 26, 3 EKoN.IZH. 13-14 (1991) [hereinafter LAw ON OwNEsHIPINTHERSFSR] translated in BUTLER,
supra note 10, at 69-84.
69. See BuTLRsupra note 10 and accompanying text.
70. LAW ON OwNERSHIPIN THERSFSR, supra note 68, art. 11, translated in BUTLER, supra note 10,
at 183, 188.
71. LAwON OWNERSH INHmRSFSR,supra note 68, art. 4, translated in BUTER, supra note 10, at
184.
72. See DECREE ON THE BAsic PRrVATE PROPERTY RIGHTS RECOGNZED BY THE RSFSR AND
PROTEcTED BY ITs COURTS, No. 36. Item 423, Sobranije Zakonov [Collected Statutes] (1922); see also
FUNDAMENTAIS oFCIvILLEGIsLATIONOFTHEUSSRAND THEUNION REPUBLICS, art. 11, adopted on Dec. 8,
1961, Gazette of the USSR Supreme Soviet, No. 55, Item 525 (1961).
73. PosTANovLENIE SOVETA MINIsTRov RSFSR OB UTVERZHDENII POLOzHENuA OB AKZaONERNI
OBSEST'VAH-, No. 601, art. 43, confirmed by the Soviet Ministrov, Dec. 25, 1990, SP RSFSR, No. 6, Item 92.
See BUTLER, supra note 10, at 214 (translating Article 43 of the Statute on Joint-Stock Societies, however the
word "participatory" in brackets indicates that Butler was troubled by the idea of shareholders' ownership,
which led him to insert the explanatory word "participatory," which is not in the Russian language of the
Statute).
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Because shareholders are considered to be the owners of a corporation, they
have the full traditional triad of civil law property rights: possession, use and
disposal. Moreover, these property rights are indivisible from each other and from
the owner. Therefore, Russian shareholders, contrary to their U.S. counterparts,
have an absolute enforceable right to dividends and a more substantial right to
participate in the management of the company.4
Due to the relative immaturity of Russian corporate and securities law, many
legal issues are still unresolved. It is very difficult to predict how the legislation
will develop further. Certainly Russian lawyers are considering the century-long
regulative experience of the Unites States and other industrial countries, which
shows that control is not necessarily associated with ownership alone. It is clear
that in order to effectuate its control over SOEs, which may be desirable for
political reasons, the state is not necessarily required to remain an absolute owner
of these enterprises. Moreover, through techniques of legal and financial engi-
neering, the state may even choose what particular ownership incident it prefers
to retain, while relinquishing others. For instance, Alberto Chilosi describes a
scheme whereby the state surrenders its voting rights in mixed property enter-
prises while retaining a substantial non-controlling share in privatized enter-
prises.75 In contrast, the golden share, another legal technique, provides the state
with the right of control over a privatized enterprise, while giving up the right to
the profit of the enterprise.
Russian civil law, with its "absolute character" of ownership relations, cannot
provide society with a legal system which combines the economic interests of
different persons and entities with those of the state. The transitional period from
a command-administrative economy to a market-driven economy demands
flexible legal forms which can not only guarantee owners sufficient power to
effectively realize their interest in the property, but also give society the legal
means of controlling the distribution of these powers according to general
principles of fairness, equity and public interest.
B. Control in the Conventional U.S. Public Corporation: A Model for
Duplication?
The question of control over a specific enterprise should be decided
individually, on a case-by-case basis. Generally, there are three categories of
participants that might have control in a typical capitalist enterprise: owners,
managers and lenders.
74. See, eg., A.V.MAWFAT&B.A.TAT1ANNiKOV,ZmNNEBuMAG3-31 (Fond Gorodskogo Razvitlja,
Yekaterinburg 1994) (addressing comments of Russian legal scholars on this subject).
75. ALBERTO CHILoSr, PROPERTY AND MANAGEMENT PRIVATIZATION IN EASTERN EUROPEAN
TRANSITION. ECONOMIC CONSEQUmNCES OF ALTENNATVE PRIVATIZATION PRoCESS 20-22 (EUI Working
Paper RSC No. 94112,1994) (Robert Schuman Centre, Eur. U. Inst, Florence, Italy).
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As a matter of law, shareholders, as owners, have full residual claim and full
dejure control over a corporation, and also bear the full risk of an enterprise's
operation. However, shareholders are neither agents nor principals of the cor-
poration. They can neither act on behalf of the corporation nor give orders to
officers or employees of the company. Instead, shareholders exercise control
through the power to elect directors of the corporation and to vote on certain
"fundamental matters." 76 As some commentators observe, the shareholders'
ability to control the operation of the corporation is much like that of citizens in
a representative democracy.77 Indeed, under the principle of "one share-one vote,"
shareholders vote in proportion to the number of their shares in the election of
directors, who are then expected to represent the interests of the shareholders by
utilizing their own business judgment.78
As Berle and Means point out, there are three sources of shareholder control
in a public corporation: (1) ownership of a majority of the voting shares; (2)
ownership of a minority of the shares through some legal device, such as pyra-
miding, the creation of a voting trust or holding company, or the issuance of
nonvoting shares; and (3) "working control" by an active minority, which arises
when a compact group owns a substantial but minority interest constituting a
majority of the stock actually represented at stockholder meetings? 9 Indeed,
similar to a representative democracy, corporate governance reflects the autocracy
of the majority or of well-organized groups, which, in the absence of rules and
regulations, might lead to the abuse of the minority or of an unorganized majority.
Nonetheless, as has often been emphasized, most ordinary shareholders are
inevitably passive and prefer to rely on market forces rather than on the influence
of their own shareholder noise to limit managerial discretion.80 Shareholder pas-
sivity may be explained by many factors, including the average shareholder's
diversification of investments, the problem of collective action, the insufficiency
of information, and the imperfection of legal regulations.
Berle and Means also note a fourth type of control. According to com-
mentators, this fourth type of control has become the most functional means of
76. See, e.g., KLEIN& COFE, supra note 59, at 120-26 (explaining that some of these "fundamental
matters" such as merger and charter approval, shareholders can vote only if the matter has been first approved
by the board of directors).
77. See KLEIN &COrFEE, supra note 59, at 120.
78. The space for direct democracy in a corporation is very limited. Generally, shareholders effectuate
their ownership control through a multilevel representative mechanism. Bernard S. Black, Shareholder
Passivity Reexamined, 89 MtacH.L.Rsv. 520,521-22 (1990). As Black described it, "the shareholders of public
companies elect directors, who watch corporate officers, who [in turn] manage/watch the company on the
shareholders' behalf." Id
79. BILE &MEANS, supra note 47, at 70-73.
80. See, &g., Black, supra note 78, at 521-22.
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control over large corporations-management control!' Ownership of voting
shares in large public corporations is so diffused that no individual or small group
has even a minority interest substantial enough to dominate the election of the
company directors. But managers do not need to own stock; the strategic advan-
tages of their position are quite sufficient to make them the major players in deter-
mining the corporate strategies and everyday activities of the company.
Managers of a conventional public corporation have their own distinctive
interests which might conflict with those of owners and employees.82 On the one
hand, managers, as managerial employees, are hired to perform the specific
function of managing an enterprise; they receive a salary and they are controlled
by owners. Like any other employee, a manager will want as much employment
security as possible. On the other hand, as managerial functionaries, managers
enjoy broad decision-making authority. Their decisions are much broader in
scope and greater in impact upon the success or failure of the business than
decisions made by lower-level employees. Delegation of authority to managers
to make important decisions, and the burdens this entails, inevitably calls for a
significant degree of power and incentives in compensation arrangementsP
Moreover, the separation of ownership from control in public corporations
has made management largely autonomous. Some scholars persuasively argue
that corporate managers tend not to pursue profit maximization but to pursue
profit-satisfaction, X-inefficiency or growth maximization!4 According to this
view, managers are biased in favor of earnings retention and "empire-building"
because their compensation levels are positively correlated with firm size and
because the larger size gives managers greater immunity from the risks of
takeover and bankruptcy. Thus, there is an incentive for inefficient growth which
leads firms to retain funds for internal expansion that might be more profitably
paid out to shareholders. 5 Indeed, according to some authors, the rate of return
on internally generated funds has been well below that of funds raised in capital
81. BEIL & MEANs, supra note 47, at 84-90. See also BARBER, supra note 3, at 54-55 (explaining
managerial control of the large public corporations as a crucial distinguishing characteristic of the twentieth
century capitalism).
82. Eirik G. Funibotn & Svetozar Pejovich, Property Rights and Economic Theory: A Survey of Recent
literature, 10 J. OFECON. Lrr. 1137-62 (1972) (dealing with the conflict of objectives between managers and
owners).
83. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incentives-It's Not How Much You Pay,
BrrrHow, HARV. Bus. REv. 138-53, May-June 1990.
84. See e.g., William Baumol, On The Theory of Oligopoly, 25 ECONOMICA 187-98 (1958); RICHARD
M. CYERT&JAMES G. MARCH, A BEHAVIORALTHEORY OFTHEFIRM (1963); Harvey Leibenstein, Aspects of
X-efficiency Theory of the Firm, 6 BELLJ. OFECoN. 580-606 (1975); ROBIN L. MARRIS, THE ECON. THEORY
OF "MANAGERIALCAPrrALISM" (1964); OLER E. W.LAMSON, THEECON. OF DISCRETIONARY BEHAVIOR:
MANAGERIAL OBJEcnvEs IN A THEORY OF TmE FIRM (1964); WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN. MANAGERIAL
CONTROLAND PERFORMANCE (1975); KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59, at 161.
85. See KLMN & CoFE, supra note 59, at 173-74.
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markets. At the same time, in building their empire, managers prefer to rely on
internally generated funds (retained earnings) as opposed to outside funds (new
debt or equity securities). If a policy of financing expansion by retaining earnings
actually increases the value of the equity, the effect will be to reduce financial
leverage which may inevitably reduce the total value of all securities!'
Although the problem of adequately monitoring managerial power is too
serious to be ignored, it is not completely unavoidable as socialists and civil law
scholars believe it to be. Indeed, there are several monitoring devices that might
be employed to control the performance of management.
First, as some commentators observe, "the easiest, cheapest, and from many
points of view, the most practical way to express stockholder dissatisfaction with
a management, a company, or an industry" is to sell stock 8  A corporation, like
any other social unit based on the principles of representative democracy, pro-
vides its constituents with a certain freedom of choice: take it or leave it. In this
sense, the act of selling a corporation's stock represents a symbolic vote against
the managers of that corporation. Even without considering the market effect of
such a sale on the managers themselves, it is obvious that shareholders who are
not satisfied with the management of a particular corporation can legally abolish
the control of the managers over their portion of equity in the company by simply
disposing of their shares. This effectively reunites ownership and control, pre-
viously separated between shareholders and managers respectively, without
disturbing the principles of civil law. 9
Second, the market for corporate control plays a major role in evaluating the
performance of the managers of an enterprise. Efficient capital market theory
implies that poor performance of a company's securities in the capital market is
86. See McEACHERN, supra note 84, at 39-51; William J. Baumol, Peggy Heim, Burton G. Malkidel,
and Richard E. Quandt, Efficiency of Corporate Investment: Reply, 55 REv. EcON. & STAT. 128 (1973).
87. KLEIN & CoFFua supra note 59, at 358. The term "leverage" usually describes the financial
consequences of the use of debt and equity. Id. at 8-12. The greater the debt, the greater the leverage. Id. The
greater the leverage, the greater the potential gains and losses for the equity. Id. Thus, debt increases the
speculative potential of the equity. Id.
88. J.A. LIvNGSm N, THE AMERICAN STOCKHOLDER 60-61 (1958).
89. See, id. As some Russian civil law scholars have noticed, the "bundle of property rights" in civil
law is quite elastic, which makes it possible in certain situations to change the conventional set of sticks (or
incidents) of property rights (to possess, use and dispose) by merely stretching the incidents away from each
other without actual severing them. rd. By stretching the bundle of property rights in this way (as opposed to
permanently separating ownership from control), the bundle retains the ability to return to its previous status
quo configuration encompassing the full set of ownership incidents. rd. See, e.g., A.B. VmENnicrov,
GOStiDARSIFVEm4AYA SocLusTnCasKAsA SoBSTVENNosT [STA'rESOCALIsTPRoPERTY] (.,nizdat, Moskva
1948); M.Y. irillova, Pravo Sobstvennosti Grazhdan I Ego Realizazija, in TEORIYA I PRATIKA
GRAZHDANSKO-PRAVOVOGO REGUuROVANuA [THEOMRY AND PRAC. OF Civ. L. REG.] 29,29-36 (Sverdlovsk
Law Institute ed., 1992); A.A. Baev, Joseph M. Rimac, Arenda Kak Osnovanije Vozniknovenua Prava
Sobstvennosti, in TEOIA I PRAKTIKA GRAZHDANSKO-PRAVOVOrO REGULIROVANUA VniEORY AND PRAC. OF
CIV. L. REG.] 64, 64-70 (Sverdlovsk L. Inst. 1992) (all of the above note the elasticity of the ownership title
in civil law).
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a common indication of poor management; this creates conditions for hostile
takeovers, generally resulting in a change of management?°
Third, shareholders are equipped with legal devices that assist them in
effectuating their ownership rights to limit managerial discretion and to realize
some rights of control over the corporation. Mechanisms of corporate account-
ability include the rules regarding proxy contest, the takeover bid, derivative and
class action litigation, federal securities regulation, the appraisal remedy in a case
of "cash-out merger," dividend payments, disclosure of compensation to
managers, and so on.
Fourth, shareholders are partially protected by the establishment offiduciary
duties of directors and officers, including the duty of due care and the duty of
loyalty. These duties impose on managers some individual liability which might
not (and in certain situations cannot) be covered by a liability insurance policy.
Fifth, product and labor markets affect the general performance of the
managers of a corporation. Certainly, managers cannot discount the competition
in these markets, since bad corporate performance on the product market affects
the profitability of the corporation as well as its managers' reputations.
Sixth, lenders, such as banks and financial institutions, might have very broad
rights of control over the corporation's decision-making process. Indeed, lenders
may bargain for the right not only to fixed interest payments on the loan, but also
to some portion of any gain on the sale of the business. Lenders may also have
the right to make some decisions in the selection of key managerial employees.
In addition, the greater the ratio of debt to equity, the greater the risk to the lender
and "the further the lender moves along the spectrum from lender to owner."9'
Yet, in some industrialized nations, particularly Germany and Japan, banks and
financial intermediaries assume a much more extensive monitoring role. For
instance, in Japan, the stock market has been relatively unimportant since
Japanese firms, organized around banks into groups called keiretsu, are largely
financed by bank loans. This provides the banks with inclusive monitoring
powers over the firms' management.
Last, a relatively new (postwar) development within capitalism has effected
a shift from individual to institutional corporate ownership which may sub-
stantially alter the face of modern capitalism, transforming it from Marx's brutal
exploitive capitalism into "capitalism without capitalists."93 Whereas, in 1950,
90. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fishel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, The Market For Corporate Control,
And The Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX L. REV. 1, 5 (1978).
91. Id.
92. See, e-g., JoHNE.RomER,AFJIuREFORSOcIAtsM41 (1994).
93. "Capitalism without capitalists" is the centerpiece of Drucker's post-capitalist society, which is
based on pooling citizens' money through various pension funds and other institutional investors. See
DRUCKER, supra note 37, at 74-78. In his early book The Unseen Revolution, Drucker remarked that if
"'socialism" is rigorously defined as "ownership of the means of production by the workers," then the United
States is the first truly "socialist" society. Drucker attempts to persuade his readers that the dominant position
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institutions owned only 8.1 percent of the total equity outstanding in the United
States, in 1991 the ownership participation of the institutional investors reached
43.5 percent of the total holdings of U.S. corporate equity.94 Generally, there are
several classes of institutional investors. They include pension funds (private pen-
sion funds and state and local government retirement funds), savings institutions
(Savings and Loan Associations, mutual savings banks, credit unions), insurance
companies and investment companies (mutual funds, real estate investment trusts,
money market trusts), and other financial intermediaries and securities dealers.95
The benefits for individual shareholders to invest through institutions are obvious.
An institution, by spreading its transaction and information costs over a large
number of individual investors, is able to supply each of its investors with an
informed diversification of investments for a small fraction of what it would cost
each investor to achieve the same diversification individually. Moreover, institu-
tions, because of the increasingly greater size of their holdings, can have greater
influence over corporations included in their portfolio than can the average
individual investor.
Thus, the problem of separation of ownership from control in the privati-
zation process might be partially resolved by empowering shareholders with the
means of directly participating in the decision-making process of the corporation.
Certainly, corporate law might substantially eliminate social anxiety surrounding
the question of losing control over the management of a public corporation by
protecting the interests of shareholders from outside takeovers and by protecting
minority shareholders from abuses by controlling shareholders.
It is important to emphasize, however, that in elaborating new corporate
legislation, former socialist countries should critically analyze U.S. and Western
corporate legislation. The corporate law of former socialist countries does not
necessarily have to fully duplicate U.S. corporate law.97 In a sense, Russia and
other former socialist countries now have a unique historical opportunity to insti-
tute a new type of corporate legislation which may be more adequate to modem
national capital market conditions than those of the world's oldest capitalist
democracies. It is not a question of superior or inferior legislation, but rather a
question of cultural and social preferences. For instance, the "logically formal
of pension funds in the U.S. economy occupies "what Socialist theory calls the 'command position' of the
economy; whoever controls them is in command of the rest." DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION, supra note
42, at 1-16.
94. See RIcHARD W. JENNINGS, HAROLD MARsH, JR., JOHN C. COFFEE. JR., SECURITIE REGULATION
16-17 (The Foundation Press. Inc. ed. 1992). According to some sources, the level of institutional ownership
is above 53%. THECHA.ENGEs AND REsPONSmULMIES oFT-sI21srCruiRY 3, 13 (1991).
95. See DAvmL. RATNE%, INSTTONAL NvESTORS 3-6 (1978).
96. See, e.g., id. at 3.
97. A mere glance at Russian company law reveals the explicit reproduction of many concepts of U.S.
law which sometimes have very little to do with the reality of the general legal framework of the national
legislation and the socio-political atmosphere in Russia.
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rationalism 98 of civil law does not accommodate the amorphous flow of pre-
cedents peculiar to common law. The absolute undivided character of civil law
property rights clashes with the compound-structural segregation of ownership
incidents; the deep community roots of Russian national culture cannot easily be
transplanted into the profit-oriented and competitive environment of capitalism.
United States corporate law is far from perfection in terms of its internal logic.
For example, why do powerful institutional investors not play an efficient moni-
toring role. despite their strikingly dominant position in dictating financial and
business strategies to U.S. corporate management? 9 The answer is obvious:
politics has never allowed financial institutions to become powerful enough to
control U.S. corporations. ' °° Mark Roe has remarked that "American politics
destroyed the most prominent alternative to the Berie-Means corporation:
concentrated institutional ownership. ' ' Indeed, financial institutions have been
overregulated by federal and state laws in such a way that financial institutions
are deliberately precluded from playing a powerful role. William Klein and John
Coffee suggest that "such legislation may have been the product of the Populist
Era's distrust of the Robber Barons of the late 19th Century or of the later
Progressive Era's skepticism about J.P. Morgan and the financial cartels of that
period. Whatever the source, some public distrust of Wall Street has deep roots
in American history...,,'o2 Certainly there is no reason to adopt this particular
form of financial legislation that is peculiar only to the U.S. system.
Another "contemporary manifestation" of the unique U.S. experience in cor-
porate regulation is the expressed legislative belligerence towards proxy contests
98. What this means is that civil law, which emphasizes systematic values, tends to operate with a great
number of legal concepts, definitions and classifications. The legal scientists of civil law countries are more
interested in developing and elaborating a theoretical scientific structure ofthe legal system than in solving
concrete problems. As John Henry Merryman expressed it, "legal science is a creation of the professors-it
smells of the lamp--and our judge-dominated [common] law is fundamentally inhospitable to it." MERYMAN,
ET AL., supra note 64, at 485.
99. Among the largest and best-known U.S. corporations, the level of institutional ownership "nearly
swallows the market." For example, nearly 30% of the top 1000 U.S. corporations had levels of institutional
ownership above 60%, including General Motors (82%), Mobil (74%), Citicorp (70%), Amoco (86%) and so
on. See JENNNGs, ET AL, supra note 94, at 17.
100. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J. FIN. EcON. 89 (1990);
Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory ofAmerican Corporate Finance, 91 CoLuM.L.REv. 10, 17 (1991). But see,
eg., Walter L. Updegrave, Prashanta Misra and Mark Bautz, How To Be A Smarter Mutual Fund Investor,
MONEY, Sept. 1994, at 70 (noting, however, that commentators observe there are some factors independent
of the legal or regulatory context that chill institutional activism, such as the cost of changing the managers
of corporations as compared with the cost of selling their stocks on the market and with the agency problem
inside the institutions themselves). See generally KLEIN & COFFEE supra note 59. Nonetheless, as Klein and
Coffee noted, the liquidity/control trade.off displays itself only in an economy organized around a securities
market. Id. See also THESEC INSTuTIONALINVEsToR STUDY REPORT, H. Doc. No. 92-94, pt. 5, at 284347
(1971), cited in DAVID L. RATNER, INSTtrruiONAL INVESTORS 506-08 (1978) (discussing the reasons for the
passive behavior of institutional investors).
101. Roesupra note 100, at 17.
102. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59, at 176 (emphasis added).
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and hostile takeovers.0 3 As Klein and Coffee put it, "shareholder democracy
differs from political democracy in one initially puzzling aspect: the incumbents
seldom lose the election."' °4 However, the "puzzle" is easily solved. United States
corporate legal regulations were undoubtedly designed "to chill insurgents and
protect incumbents "' I 5 For example, legal rules favoring incumbent management
include the following preferences: (1) management is allowed to utilize corporate
funds as long as the contest can be characterized as one of corporate policy, while
insurgents normally must bear their own expenses;1 36 (2) incumbents possess a
timing advantage, since the contestants first have to prepare and file a proxy
statement with the Securities Exchange Commission [hereinafter SEC], then
approach the managers, whom they challenge, for a full list of shareholders; (3)
the incumbent managers are allowed to change the board of directors to a
"classified board," which would preclude the insurgents from receiving
immediate full control over the board even in the event of their victory; (4) the
SEC proxy rules expose insurgents to litigation, such as litigation of the issue at
what point the proxy contest begins."°
Moreover, a variety of protective measures and defensive tadtics against
takeovers have been approved by U.S. courts. Likewise, the majority of U.S.
states have adopted anti-takeover statutes which place additional barriers in the
way of tender offers, such as the "poison pill," the "white knight," the sale of the
"crown jewel," the "lockup option," the "stock lockup," the "self-tender," the
"green-mail payment," and ESOP tactics. 8 Some jurisdictions provide a
complete defense against insurgents,'09 while others equip managers with "golden
parachutes" to protect them in a case of a successful tender offer by guaranteeing
them substantial cash payments which are triggered by the termination of employ-
ment following a takeover. 10
In addition, the U.S. experience of capital markets and corporate regulation
might not be suitable to the conditions of the undeveloped markets of former
103. KLEIN&CoFFE, supra note 59, at 176
104. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59, at 178.
105. KLEIN & COFFE, supra note 59, at 176.
106. Levin v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 264 F. Supp.797, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (holding that if the
fight is over corporate policy, it is a corporate expense, and therefore managers are to be reimbursed for their
expenses); see also Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168,173, 128"N.E.2d 291,293
(1955) (holding that, in contrast to incumbents, insurgents must pass a majority shareholder vote in order to
be reimbursed and this can happen only if they win).
107. There is an SEC filing requirement at the start of a proxy contest. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59,
at 168; see id. at 164-65 (providing additional information on proxy contests).
108. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss in detail all these measures, although the analysis of
these anti-takeover measures is very important for understanding the bias of U.S. courts in favor of corporate
incumbents. See KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59, at 186-88 (discussing additional information on defensive
tactics).
109. KLEiN &CoFFFE, supra note 59, at 187.
110. KLEIN & COFFEE, supra note 59, at 169.
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socialist countries. Under the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, security prices
reflect all available information. Theoretically, this means that security prices
adjust in an unbiased manner to any new information so rapidly that it is im-
possible for any trader to earn profits by trading on such information."' In short,
as was expressed by Klein and Coffee, "there are no undervalued stocks; nor are
there market trends which can be observed and exploited."
' 12
In contrast, the stocks of Russian privatized enterprises are generally
undervalued, thus creating many exploitable market opportunities such as an
undeveloped Russian capital market and insider trading. The complex network
of signaling devices, regulations and institutions, as developed in Western
countries over centuries, cannot be replicated overnight.
Furthermore, there is no liquidity on the Russian market. This might be
explained by several factors. First, there is limited cash available for immediate
investment. For example, there is no system of credit available for individuals;
as for foreign investors, their participation has been substantially restricted during
the first stage of privatization. Second, and peculiar to the Russian circumstances,
shares of most SOEs have been distributed to managers and workers who do not
rush to sell them, even when the price of the stock plummets. Hence, workers
continue to keep their stocks because they do not want to lose control over their
enterprise and because of a mythical ascription of personhood to their stocks,
which they deem to personify their relationship to the enterprise where their
parents and grandparents worked. Last, there is a complete vacuum of
information about certain companies whose managers refuse to provide any
information about the enterprise. In order to frighten away outside bidders, the
administration of such enterprises might publicly misrepresent facts regarding the
profitability and industrial potential of the enterprise. This is possible since there
is no independent auditorial service to verify the advertised information.
Indeed, the situation of managers in former socialist countries is quite
different than the conventional managerial position within a public corporation
in industrial capitalist countries. As a result of voucher and employee privati-
zation, managers and workers in socialist countries have been able to use the
legislative vacuum for "stripping the enterprise's assets,"'1 3 which puts them in
a unique controlling position. As inside owners, they are able to control the scope
of available information regarding the company's performance and to determine
the strategy of its development. This creates a possibility that minority outside-
investors will be abused and a further threat that the company could be looted.
Thus, voucher and employee forms of privatization distort emerging capital
markets and generate conditions in which organized crime and corruption
111. See generally KLEN & CoFFEE, supra note 59.
112. See generally KLEtN & COFFEE, supra note 59..
113. Daviddi, supra note 17, at 22-23. See also S. Johnson and H. Kroll, Managerial Strategles for
Spontaneous Privatization, 7(4) SOVIr'" ECONOMY 281-316 (1991) (explaining spontaneous privatization).
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flourish.114 The directors and managers of many SOEs, along with state officials
and judicial officers, previously unconnected with criminal activity and criminal
groups, became personally involved in illegal activity during privatization. As a
result, many former SOEs have been taken over by the managers and directors of
these criminal enterprises. Moreover, some wealthy individuals took advantage
of the system of voucher privatization by buying vouchers at low prices in order
to buy shares of the enterprises."5 In addition, the employees of the SOEs also
acquired significant blocks of their company stock. In one Russian region, for
example, workers and managers appear to have purchased an average of eighty
percent of their company's equity through the voucher process.
1 6
Apart from the problems associated with employee and voucher privatization,
there are several important issues pertaining to the separation of ownership from
control that have never arisen within the environment of capitalist markets. These
issues relate to problems accompanying so-called "partial privatization," when
government for political or other reasons retains certain equity control in the
privatized enterprises. Although partial privatization is not unique to socialist
countries, it found its broadest practical application in Russia, China and Eastern
Europe.
The question remains whether the government, as an ordinary or special
shareholder, should have some fiduciary duties to other shareholders. Clearly the
absence of regulations in this area affects investors' confidence about parti-
cipating in the equity of such enterprises.
II. THE NEW ROLE OF THE STATE: FROM THE DUTY TO SUPERVISE TO
FIDUCIARY DUTIES OWED TO THE SHAREHOLDERS OF PRIVATIZED
ENTERPRISES
The central planning system devised in the former Soviet Union clearly failed
to provide a standard of living comparable to that of Western industrial eco-
nomies. Decentralization thus became a major task and a determinative factor of
later economic reforms. Decentralization encompasses a broad spectrum of eco-
nomic reforms, including the liquidation of government monopolies, the dein-
114. The Russian State Statistics Agency reported that in 1993 alone, there were 27,654 registered crimes
related to privatization. See KompanUa Goda, Dazhe Trech Let, 1 KOMmERSANT 46.53 (1995).
115. The press reported many cases where the former state enterprises came under the control of a few
individuals. For example, Kakha Bendulidze took control of 45 Russian companies employing more than
70,000 people between them. See The Loveliness of Bankruptcy, Tim ECONOMS;T Feb. 18, 1995, at 66.
Bendukldze managed to gain control of about 300,000 vouchers, one of every 500 issued by the government.
See Simon Johnson & Heidi Kroll, Complementarities, Managers and Mass Privatization Programs after
Communism 22-23 (EUI Working Paper RSC No. 94114, 1994) (Robert Schuman Center ed., Eur. U. Inst.,
Florence. Italy). During privatization, losif Bakaleinik, the former deputy director of the Vladimir Tractor
Factory, acquired 8% of this large enterprise. Id. at 23.
116. Johnson & Kroll, supra note 115, at 23.
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tegration of the national economic complex, and the restructuring of SOEs
through securitization and privatization.
By "demonopolization," commentators mean the liquidation of the system of
exclusive government control and of the specific privileges or peculiar advantages
enjoyed by one or more SOE (such as the exclusive right to carry on a particular
business or trade, to manufacture a particular article, or to control the sale of the
whole supply of a particular commodity). In former socialist countries, the con-
centration and monopolization of industry reached an appalling intensity. One
recent Soviet study, which dealt with almost 6000 different products, found that
three-quarters of these were supplied by just one producer. 17 Most appalling is
that the largest and most powerful monopoly was the state itself. The whole
country became a large company with its own substantive economy. Competition
in the market sense did not exist; competition was simply the contest among the
state enterprises to achieve quotas established by the state plan.
The term "deintegration," or "degovernmentalization,"' ' 8 refers to the refor-
mation of the national economy by means of reorganizing the Central Federal
Ministries and the State Agencies which realized central control over the
production, distribution and exchange of commodities.
The control overproduction was realized through the Gosplan system (The
State Planning Agency) and Industrial Ministries. Gosplan not only developed the
five-year Soviet economic plan, but also set up year-to-year operative plans
providing the Ministries and Government Departments with certain quotas
(pokazateli) for each branch of industry and consumer services. Ministries and
Government Departments were established as governing bodies for different
branches of industry, agriculture, consumer services, education, public health,
news media, and even in such regulation-resistant areas as culture, theater, sports
and entertainment. The Ministries and Government Departments developed their
own quotas and applied them to SOEs, factories, and collective farms.
Government authority over distribution was exercised through the Gossnab
system (The State Supply Agency), which established reciprocal commodity
deliveries between enterprises. Gossnab also instituted control over the supply of
material resources, fuel resources, semi-finished products, spare parts and equip-
ment. As a rule, no one was allowed to go over the head of Gossnab and inde-
pendently maintain direct commercial ties between enterprises.
The government also managed the exchange of commodities through the
system of state trade, including state wholesale trade centers and state retail trade
stores and shops. Special warehouses for foodstuffs and commodities were or-
ganized for the distribution of goods through thousands of state-owned grocery
117. Flight From the Kremlin, THE ECONOMtST, Aug. 31, 1991, at 13.
118. This can be translated into Russian as razgosudarstvleniye, which basically means the act of
reducing the government's participation in industrial activity and in the ownership of productive assets.
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stores and department stores. Everything was run according to the state plan.119
Moreover, the administrative-command system even exercised control over the
population's consumption of goods. Because of shortages of many kinds of
goods,'2 a system of "coupon distribution" was introduced.
Thus, government supervision became burdensome for both producers and
consumers. The necessity of restructuring the socialist economy became obvious.
However, if demonopolization and deintegration were primarily oriented towards
reforming the macroeconomic framework and organizational pattern of the
economy as a whole, securitization and privatization of SOEs were considered a
way to abolish the basis of the whole socialist command system: exclusive state
ownership of the means of production.
Without securitization, even if enterprises enjoy full autonomy and markets
are liberalized, there is doubt as to how well the state can supervise the behavior
of management in these enterprises. It is known that the most objective method
to judge management performance is the valuation of enterprises via a stock
market.'
Thus, with securitization, the role of the state is transformed from scrupulous
supervisor to equity shareholder. As such, the socialist concept of a complete
harmonization of the interests of government, labor collectives and enterprises,
as elaborated by A.V. Venedictov, loses its significance in the new economic
conditions of the market economies of former socialist countries.'2 Being an
ordinary shareholder, the state, on the one hand, inevitably loses some control
over enterprises, and, on the other hand, assumes some new duties and obligations
towards other shareholders, such as the duties of due care and of loyalty.
119. This system gave rise to wide-spread corruption and abuses along with the development of the black
market. Having a certain executive freedom and being in possession of actual powers over commodities, those
individuals who were in charge of the distribution of goods on behalf of the government could, and often did,
give special preferences to certain customers even when the commodities were not in short supply. The
recipients of such preferences were often asked to offer preferences in return or to provide direct material
benefits such as bribes, tips or other forms of extortion. In a certain sense, we see here the existence of a
peculiar antithesis of the capital market-the mutual exchange of benefits which are not derived from the play
of the market but from the social status and monopolistic control of the benefit by one or both parties in the
transaction.
120. According to some sources, 234 out of 277 basic consumer goods have been in constant short
supply. PEm . BourrKu7 TauPoLmcALEcoNoMYoFSovrurSoctAusM: THnaFov ATwEYEARs, 1918-
1928 114 (1990). Specifically, Russian municipalities issued coupons for sugar, butter, sausage, meat, soup,
sweets, vodka, alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, gasoline and other commodities. Id.
121. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
122. According to the prominent acaderician and jurist A.V- Venedictov, founder of the theory of the
"operative management" of the Soviet SOEs, the interests of the state and the SOEs do not conflict, since the
special interest of a state enterprise "first and foremost consists in the fulfillment and over-fulfillment of a plan,
with which it was entrusted by the government." A.V. VmmiEc'roV, GossuDARsrvEtNAYA SoBsTvENNoST
[STATE PROPERTY] 350 (Academija Nauk ed., 1948).
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A. Sovereign Immunity, Reasonable Politics and the Fiduciary Duties of
the State
The doctrine of "sovereign immunity," based on the postulate that "the King
can do no wrong," formed part of the English common law heritage.1t 3 Thus,
under common law, the state has been held to be immune from tort liability. In
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank,t24 Justice Holmes articulated the underlying basis for
such immunity: "A sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal
conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there
can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends." The immunity of the state is also recognized in the U.S. Constitution.
The Eleventh Amendment proscribes suits by citizens in federal courts against
their own state unless the affected state consents.'25 Although many U.S. state
courts have abolished the blanket tort immunity of the states,' 26 this doctrine is
still present in U.S. law in a reduced form. 27
In contrast, the institutionalization of state fiduciary duties would not
contradict the civil law system, which traditionally recognizes the state as an im-
mediate subject of civil law in the non-public relations of the state with its
citizens and juridical entities. 12 As an independent, non-sovereign participant in
occasional business transactions with private entities, the state has certain rights
and incurs specific obligations.' 29 Moreover, in Russia, the state's liability might
also emerge from instances of malicious prosecution, political repression or other
state actions. The state's obligations might arise from torts caused by the state or
the state's agents during the scope of their employment. 30 Furthermore, accor
123. Russell v. Men of Devot, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798).
124. 205 U.S. 349 (1907).
125. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). However, there are several exceptions that have been
recognized by the courts, such as suits against state officials, suits against political subdivisions, and cases
where Congress abrogates the Eleventh Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
126. See, e.g., Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89 (111. 1959);
Muskopf v. Coming Hospital District, 55 Cal.2d 211 (1961).
127. State legislatures have reenacted some limited form of governmental immunity. See e.g., CAL
GoV'T CODE §§ 945 et seq. Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) did not completely abrogate government
immunity, leaving government immune for some intentional torts, for strict liability and for "discretionary"
acts by government agents. See, e.g.. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346.2671 et seq.
128. See, eg., MIcHAELBRAGINSKY, THE SOVIET STATE ASASUBJECT"OFCIVILLAW 14-34 (Progress
ed., 1988); R. KHAtnNA, STATE PROPERTY 'NmEUSSR48-59 (Progress ed., 1980).
129. It is fair to note that distinctions between "governmental" and "proprietary" functions have also
been recognized in American common law. See eg., Edgar Fuller & A. James Casner, Municipal Tort Liability
in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REV. 437 (1941). "Proprietary" functions have been construed as "those functions
that a city performs, but which could as well be provided by a private corporation." MARC A. FRANKLIN &
ROBERTL. RABIN, TORTS 187 (1993).
130. Traditionally, common law courts grant immunity to lower-level governmental officers and
employees, unless they did not follow their "ministerial" (as opposed to "discretionary") functions. See, e.g.,
Gardens v. Murphy, 377 F.Supp. 1389 (N.D. El. 1974); see also Ross v. Consumers Power Co., 363 N.W.2d
641 (Mich. 1984). Contrary to U.S. common law, Russian law does not grant immunity even to judges,
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ding to Russian law, the state may be liable for damages that have not been
caused by the state or its agents. For instance, the new Russian Law On Owner-
ship in the RSFSR [hereinafter The Law] imposes civil liability on the state for
general damages caused to individuals by crimes. The Law expressly proclaims
that "damage caused to an owner by a crime shall be compensated by the state by
decision of a court. The expenditures incurred by the state in this connection shall
be recovered from the guilty person in a judicial proceeding in accordance with
RSFSR legislation'1 3 t Thus, imposition of fiduciary duties upon the state should
not create many special problems for civil law countries, since general liability
of the sovereign is traditionally recognized in these countries.
However, application of the theory of fiduciary duties to the state as a
shareholder might be problematic from the point of view of supervision, parti-
cularly in former socialist countries with the civil law tradition of "conceptual
jurisprudence."1 32 Intuition and common sense, despite their powerful influence
on everyday human affairs, are excluded from the legal thinking. Thus, due to the
vague, open-ended concept of loyalty, the idea of fiduciary duties, as well as trust,
were absent from civil and Russian law. Moreover, the problems of con-
ceptualizing a doctrine of fiduciary duty and trust become even more serious in
former socialist countries, which, because of their ideological commitment, have
adhered more strictly to the civil law tradition. The socialist countries were also
culturally adherent to the principles of social consciousness, mutual aid, com-
munity interaction, socialist trustworthiness, and other ethical norms that were not
formulated in law. As a result, there are certain technical problems with respect
to the definition of fiduciary duties and their judicial enforcement in the former
socialist countries that may not be apparent to common law lawyers.
1 33
legislators, and high-ranking members of the executive branch. According to U.S. law, these officials are
completely immune from tort liability for acts carried out within the scope of their duties. See, e.g., Barr v.
Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959) (dealing with the immunity of the director of a federal agency).
131. See TiELAWON OWNERSHtiNTnERSFSR, supra note 68, art. 30, para. 3, translated in ButLER,
supra note 10, at 85.
132. Since communication between lawyers and interpretation of statutes become difficult without
concepts and definitions, civil law tends to give more weight to the technical side of the law.
133. For example, a problem may arise with construing the terms "special advantage" and "self-interest,"
which are ambiguous as applied to the state as sovereign. This is particularly so when the state is considered,
constitutionally, the state of the whole people. What is the "self-interest" and the "self-dealing" of the whole
people's state? Do shareholders receive some advantages from the reasonable politics of the government? What
is the "public interest," and when should the pursuit of profit maximization by particular enterprises (which
until privatization had been enterprises of the entire populace) be sacrificed for the public interest? May evil
be committed against a public entity for the sake of the universal good? What, ultimately, is the state? Should
we construe "the state" broadly as a nation, or narrowly as a political unit comprising a federation, or even
more narrowly as a particular government ministry in charge of monitoring the mixed joint-stock enterprises
with partial government participation in the equity? Are liability rules and legal remedies any different if a
"special advantage, was pursued by democratically elected politicians rather than by the government's agents?
What difference does it make, if any, if "advantages" were sought through a democratic procedure, such as
referendum or initiative, rather than by political leaders? What are the criteria for imposing fiduciary duties
on the state for self-dealing by government employees? Who is empowered to express an official state
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As Harold Demsetz has remarked, "centuries of philosophers and economists
have tried and failed to provide any workable definition of 'the fair price,' 'the
just wage,' or 'fair competition,' let alone what constitutes 'the good society'."134
Arguably, the democratic state has a duty to all its citizens, including share-
holders, who are fortunate enough to share equity in an enterprise with their state.
However, democratic participation is defined in terms of the process, rather than
in terms of the outcome of the process.'35 Accordingly, democracy does not
necessarily safeguard the interest of everyone in society. It inevitably presumes
that the decision-making process will lead to outcomes not desired by some
citizens who happen to be part of a minority.1m In a sense, democracy might well
turn into an autocracy of the majority or of well-organized groups, either of which
is equally deleterious. While the autocracy of the majority leads to the neglect or
abuse of minorities, the influence of interest-groups contributes to the corruption
and degradation of the notion of democracy.137 If the latter is true, as some public
choice literature suggests, we might conclude that legislatures and politicians
speak only for well-organized groups rather than for the general public.3 In
resolution? Is the government's action "advantageous" to the state if it promotes unpopular political or
economic measures? Should "advantages" be construed only as pecuniary benefits? Indeed, there are plenty
of unanswered questions and a great deal of confusion.
134. Harold Demsetz, Social Responsibility in the Enterprise Economy, 10 Sw. U. L. REv. 1. 1 (1978).
cited in HAMILTON, supra note 94, at 595.
135. Rousseau viewed democracy as the expression of the general will. According to Rousseau's theory
of "one person, one vote," democracy is exhausted through a legitimate process of voting. See generally JJ.
RoussEAu, THE SocIAL CONTRAct (Hafner ed., 1962).
136. Some scholars are concerned that special interest groups, through their lobbying efforts, threaten
majority rule. They allege that "majority rule is its own worst enemy," partially because of the incoherence of
majority voting patterns, and partially because of the unpredictability of the political process. This finding
particularly challenges pluralist theories because it indicates that legislation ordinarily cannot be the result of
a simple combination of preferences. In such a situation, a well-organized minority might have more chances
to satisfy its ambition. See, eg., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice,
65 TX. L. Ray. 873, 899-900 (1987).
137. If Becker is correct in saying that "actual political choices are determined by the efforts of
individuals and groups to further their own interest," such a "rent-seeking" policy will assume that "taxes,
subsidies, regulations, and other political instruments are used to raise the welfare of more influential pressure
groups" Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371.
371-74 (1983). In the words of William Landes and Richard Posner, "legislation is 'sold' by the legislature and
'bought' by the beneficiaries of the legislation." Landes & Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J. L.& ECoN. 875,877 (1975). As for the courts, they will "not enforce the moral law
or ideals of neutrality, justice, or fairness; they [will] enforce the 'deals' made by effective interest groups with
earlier legislatures." AL at 894. See eg., Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through
Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUm. L. REv. 223 (1986) (discussing rent-seeking);
Shepsle, Prospects for Formal Models of Legislatures, 10 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5 (1985) (discussing rent-seeking
also).
138. Mueller defined the theory of public choice as "the economic study of non-market decision-making,
or simply the application of economics to political science." Mueller demonstrates that the basic behavioral
postulate of public choice, as for economics, is that man is an egoistic, rational utility maximizer. D. MUELE,
PuBLic CHotcE 1 (1979). See, e.g., Farber & Frickey, supra note 136, at 873, 874 (explaining the influence
of organized groups on decision-making).
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order to prevent the influence of groups organized against corporations, there
should be certain limitations on the range of governmental appropriation of cor-
porate resources when government acts as an ordinary shareholder.
On the other hand, the government should not be allowed to exercise pro-
tectionism toward a corporation in which the state holds an equity stake. The
legislation of many countries expressly prohibits the state from acting in a pro-
tectionist fashion towards particular companies. In the United States, for instance,
the Constitution of New Jersey provides that "no donation of land or approp-
riation of money shall be made by the State or any county or municipal cor-
poration to or for the use of any society, association or corporation whatever."'
139
Although the Russian Constitution does not contain a similar postulate, Russian
civil law provides companies with the right to be treated equally by the state,
without regard to the basis of their ownership. The Law of the Russian
Federation, "On Ownership in the RSFSR" (adopted on December 24, 1990),
proclaims that "the establishment by the State in any form whatever of limitations
or privileges with respect to the right of ownership dependent upon whatever
property is in private, State, or municipal ownership or the ownership of social
associations (or organizations) shall not be permitted.'14°The preamble of another
Act of the Russian Federation, "On Enterprises and Entrepreneurial Activity," the
major Russian corporate and business law act, also declares that the same law
should apply "to all subjects of entrepreneurial activity and enterprises, irres-
pective of the form of ownership and sphere of activity, including juridical
persons and citizens of other Union Republics and foreign States. ... ,, 14The law
guarantees "equal rights of access of all subjects of entrepreneurial activity to
material, financial, labour, informational, and natural resources, and equal
conditions of activity of enterprises irrespective of their type of ownership and
organizational-legal forms thereof." 142 Thus, in Russia, it is well recognized that
the state cannot grant special privileges to any specific enterprise or organization.
However, the analysis becomes more complicated if we assume that not every
governmental action is self-dealing per se. The government should not be
punished as a shareholder of a public corporation simply because it pursues some
public interest which might be collaterally beneficial to the government and
detrimental to the shareholders. Equally important, the government should not be
precluded from participating in the equity of a particular enterprise simply
because it carries specific sovereign functions. For example, government should
not be automatically accused of self-dealing if it decreases federal interest rates,
139. NJ. CONST., art. VIII, § I, para3.
140. Tn LAWON OwNERstm IN RSFSR, supra note 68, art. 2, para. 3, at 13-14, translated in BUTLER,
supra note 10, at 71-72.
141. THELAVwONOwNERSHrP NRSFSR, supra note 68.
142. Mm LAw ON OWNERSHP IN RSFSR, supra note 68, art. 20, para. 1; translated in BUmER, supra
note 10. at 193.
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unintentionally affecting the value of its stock in mixed-ownership enterprises.
But, of course, the government should not intentionally change interest rates in
order, for example, to maximize its benefits during the conversion of its golden
shares into ordinary shares when the time for such conversion has arrived.
The most difficult problem is distinguishing whether the government
functions at a particular moment as the sovereign or whether it acts in a private
capacity. Since it is nearly impossible to separate the capacity of the government
as sovereign from the government's capacity as shareholder, it is inefficient to
impose a burden of proof on the government to justify legitimate government
regulation. As Justice Holmes stated, the government "hardly could go on if to
some extent values incident to propertyt could not be diminished without paying
for every such change in the general law." 143 If we consider every government
action that is detrimental to the shareholders of a corporation in which the
government has a controlling interest as a violation of its fiduciary duties, the
government would hardly be able to impose taxes, modify liability rules or issue
regulations; that is, to act in its capacity as sovereign.1t  Moreover, some com-
mentators allege that a corporation is not completely isolated from the society in
which it operates.145 According to this view, the corporation is not strictly private
but is "tinged with a public purpose" and "thus, corporate purpose can be seen as
including the advancement of the general welfare" as well as bearing certain
"moral obligations" towards society.'4 It thus becomes very complicated to give
a universal answer to the essential question: to what extent can a corporation
contribute "public goods" to society to its own detriment? In other words, to what
degree can a corporation tolerate government's "generosity" as a controlling
shareholder at the corporation's expense without raising the issue of the fiduciary
duty not to harm? Although government regulations are as old as civilization
143. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
144. See Richard A. Epstein, An Outline of Takings, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 3, 3-17 (1986). Even
proponents of the most conservative theories of property rights acknowledge some exceptions to the general
tendency to prohibit all government intervention in the economy. Id. For instance, Epstein contemplates two
exceptions when government action might not be considered a taking: (i) when government acts within its role
as a legitimate police power, or (ii) where both gains and losses are pro rata. Id. However, Epstein's police
power exception, which is based on methodological individualism, is construed by analogy with nuisance, or
in other words, to the situation by which government regulation is not considered a taking because the owner
should not have had this particular right in the first place. IXL Applying the second exception to the corporation,
Epstein probably would not consider it an abuse of minority shareholders by the state when the shareholders'
gains as citizens offset their losses as shareholders. Id.
145. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select Committee on Small Business, 92nd
Cong.lst Sess., (1971), cited in HAMT N, supra note 94, at 588. As U.S. Senator Nelson remarked, "The
corporation is a human invention to serve human, social needs. In theory, it is subservient both to the State
that creates it and the market in which it competes. If the corporation does not fulfill its social obligations,
under the theory, the State can amend or even revoke its charter. Id. If it lapses in econome efficiency, its
market competitors will force it to improve-or force it out." Id.
146. William T. Allen, OurSchizophrenic Conception ofthe Business Corporation, 14 CAR.ozo L. REV.
261,264-76 (1992).
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itself, the question of the legitimacy of government intervention remains the
same: "how far is too far?,,
1 47
To eliminate problems of determining whether government acts of moni-
toring a corporation are in "good faith and inherent fairness" to the minority
shareholders, we might as well adopt the common law reasoning for fairness arti-
culated in cases of government taking of private property. As was expressed by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the constitutional guarantee against government taking
of private property "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole"' t Thus, applying this test to corporate action, one should
conclude that when acting in its shareholder's capacity, the government must not
force the minority shareholders to bear public burdens which should be borne by
the public as a whole.
Accordingly, government pressure on a public corporation (in which the
government has a controlling interest) to enter into a contract with a government
entity that is wholly owed by the government is not a violation of the fiduciary
duty owed to the minority shareholders as long as the terms of the contract are not
so unfair as to make the minority shareholders alone bear the public burden of
subsidizing the government entity, which should be borne by society as a whole.
This is not a "hard core" test for fairness but rather a general approach for
understanding the problem, incapable of resolution by a standard rule. Ideally, the
question of "inherent fairness" should be decided on a case-by-case basis. Pro-
ponents of the casuistical legal system might complain about the "over-
inclusiveness" and "under-inclusiveness" of standard rules, inadequate infor-
mation at the legislative level and the irrationality of applying the same standards
to everyone. Indeed, complete and inclusive rules are not likely to appear in real
life. It is not possible to predict all potential occasions when these rules would be
applicable. Legislators do not possess enough information to create appropriate
standards of behavior to be applied to everyone in every situation. Therefore,
some legal interpretation of the rules is unavoidable. The question also arises
whether or not to trust our decision-executors and rule-interpreters (such as police
officers, prosecutors and government bureaucrats) to correctly apply the rule. To
avoid unpredictability in the application of regulation, the rules themselves should
encompass not only rules of conduct, which should be crystal clear, but also rules
of decision, which should specify the decision-making authority. And yet, the
147. In Mansfield & Swett v. Town of West Orange, 198 A. 225,229 (NJ. 1938), the Court remarked
that "planning ... [and government regulation] is as old as government itself; it is of the very essence of
civilized society." Robert H. Freilich & Thomas E. Roberts. LAND USE 152 (1994). Even though government
regulation of and restrictions on private property have existed for hundreds of years, the "goes too fax" doctrine
was first formulated in common law by Justice Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922). Holmes stated that "the general rule at least, is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes toofar it will be recognized as a taking:' (emphasis added). Id. at 415.
148. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40.49 (1960) (emphasis added)..
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existence of a specific authority presumes certain precedents and exceptions
which undermine the rules. Thus, the rules should be continually revised and
modified, though this is very costly and revives the problem of unpredictability-
which rules are intended to eliminate-due to the uncertainty of future political
decisions.
Nonetheless, due to the current socio-political atmosphere in Russia and other
former socialist countries, the rule-bound system might currently be more appro-
priate than the general casuistic system. Aside from the civil law tradition, there
are several reasons for this conclusion.
First, fiduciary duties, like duties of agents, are normally designed as "catch-
all" rules intended to fill the gaps in a contract between parties. Theoretically, if
there is a complete contract and there are no regulatory gaps, fiduciary duties are
not needed. This notion, however, is based on the assumption that fully informed,
competent parties voluntarily enter into contractual relations with each other, and
are professionally advised regarding the legal consequences of such relations.
When there are doubts about the fair and independent bargaining between the
parties, mandatory rules are preferable. In Russia, the state along with the
managers and employees of privatized enterprises are in better bargaining
positions than outside shareholders. Yet bargaining games, in which the parties
possess asymmetric information, are bound to fail. Due to the absence of
adequate legal requirements for disclosure, unregulated advertisement procedures
and undeveloped capital markets, Russian managers are in exclusive possession
of the information regarding the performance, finances and management of the
enterprise.
Second, democracy requires predictability. Rules of law, as opposed to pre-
cedents, might better serve to achieve "procedural justice" under conditions of
political instability, social and political uncertainty, and an undeveloped judicial
system with corruptible judges. Rules of law, as complete specification of the
content of law, provide constituents with the right to know in advance about their
rights and obligations.
Third, Russian judges, educated in a traditional civil law manner, are not
ready to exercise broad judicial discretion in construing issues of ethics and pub-
lic policy. Moreover, as elsewhere, there is no consensus in Russian society re-
garding public morals. There are no jury trials in civil cases, as there is no inde-
pendent judicial system. Disputes regarding corporate matters are still decided by
state arbitration, rather than by the people's courts, which are relatively inde-
pendent and separated from the government.
In this author's view, the judicial and legal systems in Russia are not yet
ready to adopt the casuistical system of judicial discretion, which might be, in the
end, an optimal system for the enforcement of various types of fiduciary duties.
The rule bound system is preferable for Russia in its current social and political
situation. However, to preserve the general principles of democracy, including the
freedom of contract, it may be advisable to introduce the mandatory "menu"
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system, which, besides establishing "fiduciary" patterns for articles of incor-
poration, would open some space for private negotiations. 49
The issue of fiduciary duties with regard to the state as a shareholder may
arise in the following situations: (1) when the state acts entirely in the capacity of
an ordinary shareholder (controlling or minority); (2) when the state acts only as
a "special shareholder" without possessing any equity interest in the corporation;
and (3) when the state acts in its double capacity as both an ordinary shareholder
and a special shareholder. The determination of the state's fiduciary duties in
these situations also depends on whether we are dealing with a public corporation
or a close corporation. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze the question of the
state's fiduciary duties along these lines.
B. Fiduciary Duties of the State as an Ordihary Shareholder
1. In Public Corporations
a. Government as a Controlling Shareholder
Generally, the concept of open-ended fiduciary duties, generated within the
common law system of trust, is not known in civil law. Even though rapid
changes in the legislation of many civil law countries are under way, the develop-
ment of a theory of fiduciary duties in these countries is far from its logical
completion.so Although a new Russian law has reproduced the traditional U.S.
(common law) variant of the duty of loyalty, it has been applied exclusively to the
directors of corporations. 5 1 Russian civil law does not yet recognize the fiduciary
duties of controlling shareholders in public corporations; neither does it acknow-
ledge the existence of shareholders' fiduciary duties in close corporations. There-
fore, normative perspectives for developing the legislative base make it is
necessary to analyze the concept of the fiduciary duties of the state from the point
of view of U.S. corporate law.
149. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, Address at the
Stanford Law and Economics Seminar, Feb. 16, 1995, at 63-65 (on file with this author).
150. For instance, Japanese corporate law still does not recognize the distinction between the duty of care
and the duty of loyalty (emphasis added). See SHOHO (Commercial Code), art. 254-3. Japanese corporate law
also does not recognize the fiduciary duties of shareholders. See Kondo, Torishimariyaku No Keiei Sekinin
IDirectors' Duties], 3 GENDAi KIGYO Ho KoZA [LEcnmEs iN CONTEw. Bus. ENTRPRIsE] 293, 295-299 (A.
Takeuchi & M. Tatsuta eds., Tokyo University Press, 1985). On the distinction between the fiduciary duty of
loyalty and the duty of care in U.S. corporate law, see Kenneth E. Scott, The Role of Preconceptions in Policy
Analysis in Law: A Response to Fischel and Bradley, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 299 (1986).
151. See, e.g., MODELSTATtrrEOFPUBLICLY-HEDJONT-STocK COMPANY, art. 7, Supplement to the
RF President's Edict On Organizational Measures for Transforming State Enterprises and Voluntary
Associations of State Enterprises into Joint-Stock Companies, No. 721, July 1, 1992, in ROSSuSKAJA GAzErA,
July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
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Under common law, the concept of fiduciary duties applies to shareholders
to the extent that a shareholder holds the power to control a corporation or has
some other practical ability, as in a close corporation, to substantially affect or
block the decisionmaking process. As a general rule, controlling shareholders in
conventional U.S. corporations must refrain from using their control to obtain
special advantages for themselves at the expense of minority shareholders. 152 This
fiduciary obligation is frequently construed by the courts as an obligation to act
in "good faith and inherent fairness" toward the minority in the course of trans-
actions where control of the corporation is material,'3 i.e., when the controlling
shareholder enters into business dealings with the corporation or when the con-
trolling shareholder causes the corporation to make fundamental changes, such
as mergers or amendments of the articles of corporation, that may promote the
controlling shareholder's own self-interest at the expense of the minority.154
It is unclear why this standard cannot be applied to the state when it acts as
an ordinary controlling shareholder without a golden share. Yet, the government
is more predisposed to relinquishing the pursuit of earnings optimization than are
private shareholders. Government has objectives that may not coincide with the
profitable operation of corporations. Government is inevitably concerned with
combating inflation, unemployment, balancing the budget, defense spending,
social services, regional development and obtaining the maximum number of
votes during elections.
t55
The state should not be allowed to accomplish its pecuniary or non-pecuniary
public policy goals at the expense of the other shareholders. In other words, the
state should be precluded from abusing its position as the dominant shareholder
in a mixed-ownership corporation. Otherwise, privatization and transformation
of SOEs into publicly-held corporations would not be a significant improvement
over the formerly state-centralized enterprises.
For example, if a contract is unfair-as when the state, by utilizing its
controlling power, compels a corporation to enter into a contract with another
SOE or government entity for the purchase of obsolete and unmarketable equip-
ment or of useless services for a price that is well above that which would be set
in an arm's-length bargain-the state has breached its fiduciary duty to the
minority shareholders. In this situation, the government's objective in entering
152. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939).
153. In Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal3d 93, 108, 81 Cal.Rptr. 592,460 P.2d 464 (1969), the
court stated that "majority shareholders. .. have a fiduciary responsibility to the minority and to the
corporation to use their ability to control the corporation in a fair, just and equitable manner." Id.
154. On the question of unfair business dealings on the part of controlling shareholders with the
corporation, see Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del.1971); on the requirement of fairness in
fundamental changes of corporate structure, see Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del.1952).
155. See, ag., B. Caillaud, R. Guesnerie, P. Rey, & J. Tirole, Government Intervention in Production
and Incentives Theory: A Review of Recent Contributions, 19 RANDL OFECON. 1, 1-26 (1988) (discussing the
policy of capturing votes).
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into this kind of transaction is irrelevant, as long as the government cannot offer
a satisfactory business justification for the particular deal.
Furthermore, government does not participate directly in the decision-making
process of corporations in which it holds a controlling interest, but acts through
its authorized agents, who often have distinctive interests clashing with the profit-
maximizing goals of the corporation. If a fiduciary duty is not imposed on these
decision makers, they might be tempted to maximize their own benefit at the cost
of the corporation. Even if the state or the corporation provides these agents with
some equity interest, the problem is not eliminated entirely, since managers per-
sonally will bear only a fraction of the costs of the pecuniary or non-pecuniary
benefits they take out of the corporation in maximizing their own utility.!5 6
Therefore, the authorized representatives of the government who sit on a
corporation's board of directors should first represent the interests of the
corporation and of its shareholders. In this sense, Stone's view of corporate
managers as agents-of-society who should go beyond considerations of profit
maximization, ultra vires and market efficiency, thereby taking into account all
of the human, social and environmental consequences of their business decisions,
is still utopian. 57 Moral reformers like Stone and Drucker?5 1 are not taken
seriously today because they fail to account for the reality of modem capital
markets and the present level of development of public consciousness. Since there
are some participants in the market who do not share their views as to the social
responsibilities of the corporation, the overall demand for shares of corporations
that hire "moral agents" rather than managers is affected. 9 For example, the
price of stock of "socially responsible" corporations would most likely decrease,
exposing such corporations to hostile takeovers and the replacement of managers.
At least until a substantial evolution in general human consciousness occurs, if
such is possible, the conflict of interests between society, shareholders and
156. See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory ofthe Fir= Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 305-360 (1976) (describing managerial behavior and
ownership structure).
157. Stone, Corporate Regulation: The Place of Social Responsibility, in CORRIGIBLE CORPORATIONS
& UNRULY LAW (B. Fisse & P. French eds. 1985).
158. Peter Drucker bases his model of post-capitalist society on the notion of a shift from a profit-
maximizing society to a knowledge society in which the factor of production is "neither capital nor land nor
labor" but knowledge. Drucker's dreams are the same as those of Frederick Taylor, who imagined a society
"in which owners and workers, capitalists and proletarians, could sham a common interest in productivity and
could build a harmonious relationship on the application of knowledge to work." DRUCKER, supra note 37.
159. Certainly, many shareholders would agree with Milton Friedman that the responsibility of corporate
managers is to fulfill the terms of their contract with the corporation, which is "to make as much money for
the stockholders as possible:' Milton Friedman confessed that he would not buy stock in a company that
attempts to stop pollution out of a sense of social responsibility. Playboy Interview: Milton Friedman,
PLAYBOY MAGAzRnE. Feb. 1973. at 59, cited in Hamilton, supra note 94, at 589. Milton Friedman is known
for receiving the 1976 Nobel Prize in Economics for his theories of monetary control and government
nonintervention in the economy.
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corporate managers is irreconcilable without the establishment of legal rules for
corporations, restrictions on the government, and fiduciary duties for managers.
Thus, in order to preclude the influence that political parties may have on
corporate directors, it would be feasible to create some legal mechanisms that
would give directors independence from local and central governments. For
instance, relations between directors and the government may be specified in a
contract, which would be subject to mandatory legislative requirements due to the
unequal bargaining position of the parties.
b. Government as a Non-Controlling Shareholder
Generally, non-controlling shareholders in a public corporation do not owe
a fiduciary duty to majority shareholders. This is logical, since fiduciary duties
are a judicial creation, constructed in order to preclude possible abuses of repre-
sentatives by their agents. Since minority shareholders do not have enough voting
power to represent those who have a majority equity stake, they cannot possibly
abuse their power. Thus, it is not possible to misuse something that you do not
have.
Nonetheless, the state in its position as a non-controlling shareholder, even
without a golden share, enjoys a unique bargaining situation and ability to
influence the decision-making process. The government inevitably possesses
more material information than any single shareholder or entity. Moreover, the
government has the power of legislative initiative; it determines financial policy;
it controls judicial and law enforcement agencies; it establishes tariffs, quotas and
taxes; it regulates labor relations; and it imposes zoning regulations. For example,
in Russia the government is empowered to issue binding law-implementing
resolutions and directives aimed at particular enterprises or organizations. "0 The
President of Russia has the power to issue decrees and directives binding through-
out the Russian Federation, so long as they are not "at variance with the
Constitution of the Russian Federation or federal laws."161 In other words, the
Russian government and President possess an enormous capacity to influence the
board of directors of almost any national corporation by issuing an individual
decree pertaining to the specific business matters of the particular company.
In such circumstances, the law should expressly provide for legal remedies
that would preclude the state from exercising undue influence over the share-
holders and officers of corporations. Thus, the state as a non-controlling share-
holder should still have the fiduciary duties of "business judgment" and "entire
fairness" toward the other shareholders and the company.
160. See KoNST. RSFSR, art. 115.
161. Id. art. 90, para. 2-3.
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2. In Close Corporations
It is well recognized in U.S. corporate law that shareholders of a close
corporation owe each other a fiduciary duty of "utmost good faith and loyalty."' 62
This duty is imposed on all shareholders of a close corporation, majority or
minority. As one court held, shareholders in a close corporation "may not act out
of avarice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loyalty to the
other shareholders and to the corporation."' The rationale of this holding is
obvious: there is no practical market for the stock of a close corporation and the
abused shareholders cannot easily extricate themselves from the corporate
venture.16 One solution to this problem is abuy-out agreement. Another solution
is to establish fiduciary duties.
By analogy, the state as an ordinary shareholder in a close corporation should
not be allowed to act out of expediency or self-interest in derogation of its duties
of good faith and loyalty to the other shareholders and to the company. For
instance, the state, as a minority shareholder, should not exercise its veto power
unreasonably.'6 An example of an unreasonable veto in the Russian context is
when the state as a shareholder refuses to change an existing unprofitable line of
production, or blocks a decision made for business reasons, in order to switch the
national flag of the carriers of a shipping corporation, which the government
believes harms the national interest. Although the state may legally block these
decisions when it possesses the golden share, the government should not be
allowed to employ the same technique when it acts in its exclusive capacity as an
ordinary shareholder if the veto is unduly prejudicial to the rest of the share-
holders. After all, in the case where the state holds the golden share, prospective
shareholders will realize that the government as a special shareholder can exercise
its veto power with respect to certain matters, and, hence, the price which they
will pay for the shares will reflect the effect of the divergence between the state's
interest and theirs. In contrast, when the government participates in a joint-stock
company as an ordinary shareholder, the other shareholders should be entitled to
expect that the general rules of fiduciary duties apply to all shareholders and
directors, including the government and its agents.
162. Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 593 (1975), 328 N.E.2d 505
(Mass. 1975).
163. rd. at 593.
164. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 F.2d 3 (Ist Cir.1986) (discussing the freeze-out of minority
shareholders).
165. By analogy, a minority shareholder in a close corporation cannot use veto power unreasonably. See,
e.g., Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. 1981).
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C. Fiduciary Duties of the State as a Special Shareholder
The concept of special shareholder, or golden shareholder, originated during
the British privatization of the 1980s, when the then-state-held firms, such as
Britoil and Jaguar, were sold off by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's
Conservative government.'6 The British Government retained so-called golden
shares in both these enterprises, allowing the government to outvote all share-
holders regardless of the number of shares held by the government. This tech-
nique has been employed during privatization by the governments of many
countries. In Russia alone, by the beginning of 1994, golden shares had been
issued to the government by 125 joint-stock companies. 167
In short, the provisions regarding the golden share enable the government to
exercise a certain control over a privatized enterprise after the state has become
a minority shareholder or even after total privatization. Thus, a golden share
empowers the state with a control disproportionate to the state's equity in an
enterprise. This "authority-giving" quality of the share makes it "golden" in the
eyes of ordinary shareholders.
Because of its special extraordinary powers and the goal it tends to achieve,
the golden share can only be held by the government.'ce This requirement restricts
the transferability of the golden share, which is not tradable on secondary markets
and not consignable to non-government entities.
With respect to the fiduciary duties of the state, it is one thing when the state
acts entirely in its traditional shareholder capacity, and another when the state acts
as a special (golden) shareholder. Presumably, when the state has a conventional
equity interest in a corporation (no golden share), it should owe the usual duty of
fairness to the other shareholders. But when the state exercises its right of veto in
its capacity as a special shareholder, it cannot be forced to act fairly towards other
shareholders if the vetoed action would have been contrary to the national interest
or to some other purposes for which the golden share was established. Otherwise,
the purpose of the golden share in preserving strategic national or public policy
interests would be undermined, since practically all government vetoes might be
166. See Britoil SaysAssets Worth 55% More Than BP Offers, L.A.T Ts, Jan. 20, 1988, Bus. Section,
at 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File (on the privatization of Britoil); see also Jim Mateja,
Ford Steps up Pursuit ofJaguar, Cm. TRIt., Oct. 25, 1989, Bus. Section, at 1, available in LEXIS, Papersmj
Database (on the 1984 privatization of Jaguar).
167. Privatization In Figures, Text of Report by the Russian Federal Property Fund's Consolidated
Analyst Deparment, ROSSIYSKAYAGAZErA (Moscow), Jan. 27, 1994, at4, available in WESTLAW, Int-News
Database.
168. For instance, according to the British Telecom Prospectus, "the Special Share may only be held by
or transferred to the Secretary of State or another Minister of the Crown or any person acting on behalf of the
crown." See British Telecom Prospectus, C-ARLEs VJYLsTEiE., I TEcHmQ ES oFPRIVATIZATION OF STATE -
OWNED ENTERPRISFS 166 (World Bank Technical Paper No. 88, The World Bank, Wash. D.C., July 1988);
see also The RFPresident's Edict on Industrial Policy in the Privatization of State Enterprises, No. 1392, Nov.
16,1992, art. 4, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allw]d File.
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construed as inherently unfair to the minority shareholders, while beneficial to the
state. For example, suppose that in the case of the company Zim, in which the
Israeli government retains a golden share in order to require the company's ships
to remain under Israel's flag, the government exercises its right to veto a proposal
to change the flag.' 69 The shareholders might argue that such a veto is detrimental
to them because the corporation incurs continuous losses due to burdensome
national labor laws, strong trade unions and high taxation and tariffs. None-
theless, the requirement for Zim to preserve the national flag was the purpose of
retaining the golden share by the Israeli government. By requiring its carriers to
remain under Israel's national flag, the government secures its ability to call them
into requisition in case of a national emergency. The shareholders were aware of
such requirement and the price they paid for their shares of stock certainly
reflected the inability of the company to change the flag under which its carriers
sailed.7 o
Of course, the provisions of the golden share must necessarily be disclosed
in a company's prospectus.17 1 Since the provisions for a golden share are pro-
nounced in legislative acts and corporate documents, the shareholders by buying
stocks in such a company are deemed to have consented to such provisions.
Therefore, the shareholders are not actually damaged by the government's veto,
unless the government's action is completely unreasonable, arbitrary or unrelated
to the purpose of the golden share.
The "reasonableness" test should remain as a means of evaluating govern-
mental actions as a special shareholder. The test might include the requirements
that a legitimate governmental objective be demonstrated for a particular veto and
that a rational relations hip exist between the means (veto) and the state's
objective.172 In other words, a veto should be upheld if it is rationally related to
the legitimate governmental purpose of retaining the golden share preliminarily
specified in the prospectus. Of course, the reasonableness of governmental actions
should be challengeable before independent judicial organs. 73
169. David Lipkin, Israel: Zim Profits Rise to $23M Despite Stiff Competition, Lloyds List, Nov. 24,
1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File.
170. However, the government should also be precluded from granting to the company any cargo
preferences, direct shipping subsidies, tax benefits or other economic benefits. Arguably, in advancing the
company's competitiveness, the government pursues its own pecuniary interest, since the government has an
equity interest in the company. However, in what other manner can the government provide for the profitable
operation of the shipping company which loses money by remaining under the national flag? This question
goes to the problem of distinguishing the government's role as sovereign from its capacity as a shareholder,
which should be resolved on a case-by.case basis.
17 1. See, e.g., The British Telecom Prospectus, supra note 168, at 166.
172. The Russian Constitution does not establish standards ofjudicial review of governmental actions
that are known to U.S. constitutional law. In my view, in the case of the golden share, the standard of review
should be analogous to the U.S. standard of "mere rationality."
173. In France, since the approval of certain actions by the Minister of the Economy is considered a
"unilateral decision of an administrative nature," such a decision may only be challenged before an
administrative judge in the event of dispute. Philippe Sarrailhe, Privatization in France in 1993, 7 INT'L L.
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D. Fiduciary Duties of the State When It Acts in a Double Capacity as a
Special and Ordinary Shareholder
In certain situations, the government wants not only to retain veto power over
specific strategic decisions made by management but also to retain the right to
participate in the profit of a privatized enterprise (as when a government holds an
equity stake in an enterprise and receives dividends). To accomplish its goals, the
government may use the golden share technique together with an equity share in
the corporation.
For instance, during the privatization of the steel company Siderurgia
Nacional, the Portuguese government retained a twenty-five percent golden share
in the company,174 but decided to hold only a ten percent golden share in Petrogal
and the gas supply consortium. 75 The Hungarian government retains twenty-five
percent and a golden share in its non-nuclear state electricity companies, but con-
siders the retention of only one golden share in the gas distribution companies
sufficient to exercise control over certain strategic decisions.1 76 In Russia, during
privatization of the national gold industry, the government retained thirty-eight
to fifty-one percent of the equity stock in twenty-five companies, while retaining
only a single golden share in seventeen other companies.1 "7 Indeed, as a general
rule, holding the golden share alone provides the government with substantial
powers to veto management decisions regardless of the percentage of the equity
the government possesses in the enterprise. 178However, if the government wants
to participate in a company's profit, a single golden share will not be sufficient.
Thus, when the government holds equity stock in an enterprise plus a golden
share, the fiduciary duties of government towards shareholders should be the
same as in the case when government retains only the golden share. Additional
duties and liabilities should not be imposed upon the government simply because
it decides to preserve some equity in an enterprise. As long as the decision to
retain a golden share is publicly disclosed, shareholders should not have undue
expectations about the future development of an enterprise, and this would be
PRActcuM 28 (1994). In Russia, disputes of this kind are resolved by the state arbitration court.
174. SN For Sale, PPIVAT7-AIONINT'L, Feb. 1, 1991. available in WESTLAW, Prvint Library.
175. See Plot to Gain Control ofPetrogal, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, Apr. 1, 1993, available in WESTLAW,
Prvint Library (WL 278726); see also New Gas Project in Portugal, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, June 1, 1993.
available in WESTLAW, Prvint Library.
176. See Energy Market Report: Natural Gas, ENERGY ECON., Dec. 22, 1994. available in LEXIS.
World Library, Allwld File.
177. Yana Mirontseva, Russia's Gold Reserve Is To Expand By The Year 2000, RusData DiaLine.
BizEcon News, Aug. 10, 1994, available in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File; see also Tupolev Plant
Privatized, 3 AVIATION EUROPE5, § Manufacturers, No. 4, Jan. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, World Library,
Aliwld File (describing the privatization of Russia's Tupolev aviation complex, in which government retained
a golden share).
178. See, e.g., Peter Wise, Lisbon Embraces Popular Capitalism, PRIVATIZATION INT'L, May 1, 1994,
available in WESTLAW, Prvint Library.
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reflected in the price they are willing to pay for the shares. Since the main
purpose of a golden share is to preserve the status quo of the present industrial
activity of an enterprise, the future profitability of the company is not obscure. As
a rule, the golden share is preserved by the government for a short period of time
and for strictly specified purposes. Investors who do not want to participate
together with the government in such a venture may choose other alternatives for
investments. Moreover, the government itself will be interested in exercising its
veto right in the most prudent manner, because a government veto that prevents
more profitable activity will also harm the state, which would have an equity
interest in the enterprise.
IV. THE TRUST AS A CONTRACTUAL MECHANISM OF MONITORING LARGE
FIRMS
A. Trusts and the Civil Law System
Fiduciary ownership, or trust, is a juridical institution peculiar to the Anglo-
Saxon system of law. It has no direct analogies in the continental civil law sys-
tem, which was derived from Roman law.179 The idea of trust was developed in
England due to the separation of law and equity, which were administered in
separate tribunals with different methods of procedure. According to Austin
Scott, but for such an "essential" difference between the procedure in equity and
the procedure in law, "the trust, at least as we know it, would never have
developed."'' t Thus, Scott claims that the distinction between law and equity is
responsible for the legal characteristics of the trust and, therefore, the trust, in its
particular form, is unique to the Anglo-American system of law.
179. Trusts were unknown in classical or post-classical Roman law, although some of the analogous
functions that are performed in the Anglo-Saxon system by the use of the trust were achieved in the Roman
law through the rights of 'Yura in re aliend' (lat., meaning "the rights to someone else's property'), which
included such rights as usus. usufructus,fidei commisswn or bonorum possessio. See, e.g., George T. Bogert,
TRUSTS 7 (6th ed. 1987) (describing an example wherefidei commissum served as a legal device to circumvent
Roman law's prohibition of the transference of property to certain persons, for instance, non-Roman citizens,
who were legally incompetent to hold property directly). These juridical institutions possessed such a similar
pattern of execution that the earlier view was that trusts and uses had their origin in thefide.commissum. See,
e.g., STORY, EQ. JuRts. §§ 966, 967. However, there is not much disagreement between scholars today that
the trust had no connection with thefidel commissium or other juridical institutions or concepts of Roman law,
although there is a "certain analogy or similarity between them:' See, e.g., I AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOtT &
WLLtAM FkANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUS"s 28-30 (4th ed. 1986)(1939) [hereinafter ScoTT ON
TRUSTs]; Ames, Origin ofUses and Trusts. 2 SELECESSAYS 1NANGLO-AmmR1CAN LEGAL HISTORY, 739,740;
Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 127, 136.
180. See generally Scorr ON TRUSTS, supra note 179.
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Apparently, there was no specific economic necessity for creating the juridical
institutions of uses and trusts in old England. 81 Rather, the initial reason for the
invention of trusts was social, in the sense of "justice-making."'82 Indeed, "the
parents of the trust were fraud and fear" and "the court of conscience was its
nurse.
l' 83
However, despite its more or less accidental birth, the trust, as a device for
making dispositions of property, became, in the phrase of Maitland, "the greatest
and most distinctive achievement performed by Englishmen in the field of juris-
prudence.:""ea The trust created a system of equitable ownership, giving the
beneficiary an interest in the property and protection in the enjoyment of that
interest. The result was something unique and, at first glance, not digestible by
civil law: a splintered, compound-structural or double form of ownership. The
beneficiary holds the equitable ownership; the trustee holds the legal title.
However, many years after the separation of law and equity, trusts began to
fulfill an important economic function in the realization of the ownership rights
of the settlor to dispose of his property in the most desirable manner. As Maitland
says, the trust "is an 'institute' of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, as
general as contract. ' ' tS Indeed, a trust is a very "elastic" and agile legal tool. One
can create a trust for any conceivable purpose, so long as it is not illegal or
against public policy. The creator of the trust may choose the duties he wants to
impose on the trustee and the interests he wants to confer upon the beneficiaries.
181. Uses and trusts were introduced into England not long after the Norman Conquest. According to
Maitland, the first general employment of such uses was in the thirteenth century. See Frederic William
Maitland, EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAw 25 (1936) (1929) [hereinafter EQUITY];
Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 3 HARV. L. REV. 127, 129 (1894); see generally James B. Ames, The Origin of
Uses and Trusts, in 2 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 737, 752 (Committee of the
Association of American Law Schools eds. 1968) (1908). It seems that Bogert asserts some economic reasons
for the introduction of trust. Among them might be considered the goal of enabling religious houses to obtain
profits from land, notwithstanding the mortmain acts which prohibited them from owning land. However, such
a legal scheme was known also in continental Europe as a purchase-credit type of contract. An example may
be found in the contract of Wiederkauf or Rentenkauf, which had widespread application in the Western
provinces of Russia, in addition to being known to German Law. This contract concerned the sale of an estate
by ecclesiastic or religious houses to private persons with a special condition that the buyer may accept a
perpetual obligation to pay seven percent annual interest on the amount of money which he paid to the seller.
In exchange, the seller waives his right to demand the surrendered amount of money, and if the buyer breaks
the terms of the agreement, he was obliged to reimburse the seller with the full amount of the selling price or
return the property itself. See V. Bartenev, Dogovor Wiederkaufa in zapadnich gubernlach, 4 ZURNAL
MINISTERSTAVA JUSTIZI 38-39 (1865).
182. In the fourteenth century, the conveyances for the us* of the transferor (a prototype of uses or trusts)
were employed for the purpose of defrauding creditors. However, during this period uses were mere honorary
obligations resting upon the good faith of the transferee. The transferor was free from the burdens of
ownership, and, therefore, not reachable by the creditors; but on the other hand, he had no legal rights against
a fraudulent transferee. See SCOTT ON TRUSTS, supra note 179, at 12-18.
183. George Bogert's citation of an English lawyer, in my opinion, correctly characterizes the
circumstances of the birth of trusts in England. See Bogert supra note 179, at 7.
184. SCOTTr NTRUSTS, supra note 179, at 2. quoting EQurrY, supra note 180, at 23.
185. SCOTToNTRUSTS,supra note 179, at 2, quoting EQUrrY, supra note 180, at 23.
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Moreover, the settlor may reserve to himself, or create in another, the power to
alter the provisions of the trust.Ies Such a power is frequently very desirable
because it gives the creator of the trust a power to control the trustee's activity in
managing the trust, and therefore, control over the trust estate including a right
to revoke the trust.
187
The role of trusts in society is quite broad. A trust is available for realization
of all kinds of economic functions: planning of estates, risk-shifting, credit
operations, financing, managing the settlor's property, protecting the beneficiaries
against misfortune or waste through a spendthrift clause, settling of disputes in
order to achieve a purpose which is deemed to be in the public interest, and
furnishing security to lenders.1ea Thus, trusteeship has become an important
juridical institution for the realization of property rights. Modem business, in the
language of Issacs, has become "honey-combed with trusteeship."
189
Furthermore, in spite of the fact that a "compound-structural" model of trust
is peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon system of (common) law and alien to continental
civil law, the situations in which trust is applied are not unique to jurisdictions in
which the common law prevails. Scott notes that varying legal devices have been
invented in different legal systems to meet the same needs as the institution of
trust. 90 Fiduciary property or trusts do not have any direct analogies in Soviet
civil law legislation. Russian literature has clearly expressed the view that using
the theoretical model of fiduciary ownership as per the continental legal system
would inevitably cause "incalculable impediments, both of a legislative and
practical nature" and demand "repudiation of a great many proven legal con-
structions, which have existed from the times of Roman Law."' 9 In essence, the
contention that the concept of trusts is destructive to the logical form of the
system of Russian civil law was one of the main arguments against trusts among
186. Bogert, supra note 179. at 514.
187. Under the power to amend, an irrevocable trust may be made revocable or a revocable trust made
irrevocable. See Bogert supra note 179, at 516.
188. See, eg., Bogert. supra note 179, at 173-74 (reviewing the common purposes of private trusts and
the concrete case precedents where they were met); see also Isaacs, Trusteeship in Modern Business, 42 HARV.
L. REV. 1048 (1929).
189. See Isaacs, supra note 188.
190. See, eg., ScorroN TnuSTs, supra note 179, at 228-29 (reviewing publications dealing with trusts
and trust-like devices that serve the purposes of trust in various legal systems). See generally Vera Bolgar, Why
No Trusts in the Civil Law?, 2 AM. . COMP. L. 204 (1953); Common Law Trusts in Civil Law Courts, 67
HARV. L REv. 1030 (1954); Beinart, Trusts in Roman andRoman.Dutch Law, I J. LEOAL HisTOR Y 6 (1980).
In Louisiana, whose legal system is founded on the Code Civil, trusts were not recognized until 1920 (when
they were validated to a limited extent). See BoGERT, TRusr AND TRUSTEES §§ 2, 7 (rev. 2d. ed.). The
Louisiana Trust Code was adopted only in 1964. Ld.
191. D.A. Medvedev, K VoprosyoPrirode Prava Gosudarstvennogo Predpriyatia na Imushestvo [On
The Question of The Nature of The Right of The State Enterprise to The Assets], in PRAVO SOBsTvENNOSTI V
USLOVIYACHSOVERSHENSTVOVANA SOCIALWtA 50-5I (IGPAN ed., 1989).
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Russian lawyers.192 It is the author's view that such arguments lack merit and are
unpersuasive, and moreover, suffer from legal dogmatism and pedantry.
One cannot censure this approach better than the famous Russian civil law
scholar Leshkov, who in the middle of the last century, argued that:
No nation whatever can eternally and invariably adhere in the area of
civil law to once given norms, not only foreign, but also their own, just
as the Romans did not follow the foundations of their XI Tables forever,
or as the western nations did not adhere to their Leges Barbarozum, or
the Russians to their Ruskaja Pravda. The civil law of all nations, as
history teaches, properly is created only by life, or in other words, by will
and liberty, and, therefore, by the needs of the particular time, place,
nation and life.193
Indeed, the Roman law model of "one thing-one owner" cannot embrace all
varieties of social relations that arise from the modem regulation of the market.
In order to separate ownership from production, while still preserving the pro-
ducer's entrepreneurial initiative by furnishing him with incidents of ownership,
civil law jurists must reconcile themselves to the idea of splintered ownership.
For example, the rights of "operative management" and "full economic
control," that have been known to Soviet civil law, are unique among property
rights in continental civil law systems. 94 With certain reservations, these rights
are most closely related to the theory of a "splintered," "compound-structural" or
"double form" model of ownership which has no direct analogies in civil law. But
despite its unique and alien nature, these rights were recognized by Russian civil
law as universal and were used for the legal characterization of property rights of
autonomous self-supporting SOEs. Furthermore, Russian legislators proceeded
further and adopted the law on fiduciary property or trust in 1994.95 Thus, the
model of absolute ownership was splintered due to the "needs of the particular
time, place, nation and life," as was described by Leshkov.
192. For example, a professor of the Finance Academy, Mirkin, and the Main Specialist of the
Department of Privatization and New Economic Structures, Medina, argued that a new legal term, "fiduciary
property," is "inconsistent with the Roman-German system of law" which exists in Russia, and that this is why
the introduction of trust will demand fundamental changes of all legislative acts related to the regulation of any
and all types of property which currently exist in Russia, including the Civil Code and The Law On Property
in Russia. Y. Mirkina & L Medina, Doveriat' li trastu? 5 EKON. IZH. 17 (1994).
193. V.N. Leshkov, Neskol'ko sloe ob otnoshenii grazgdanskogo jrkogoprava k novim Ik russkomt,
Igrazgdanskoggo prava k forgovomu, 8 JURIDICHESKII VESTMK 2 (1872).
194. See, e-g., GK RSFSR (Russian Civil Code), ch. 19, adopted by the State Duma and affirmed by The
Soviet of Federation, Oct. 21, 1994, No. 51-F3.
195. Ukaz of the President of Russian Federation No. 2296, ODOVERrr:L'NIS OBSTvENNOSTI (TRuSTE)
[DcRE No.2296"ONFmucARYPRoPERTYC'Iusr], Dec. 24, 1993, in 5 EKoN.I ZH. 16 (1994), available
in LEXIS, World Library, Allwld File. However, the newbom legal institution of trust was not included in the
draft of Russian Civil Code, probably because of its "non-standard nature." Id.
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B. The Trust as a Model for Monitoring a State-Owned Enterprise?
Some commentators have suggested using a trust scheme to monitor SOEs,
which would supposedly provide the government with desired control over SOEs
while still giving managers effective monitoring powers.'9 In other words, they
propose using trust for something that was not achieved, according to them, by
the practical application of concepts of operative management and full economic
control;197 specifically, the government's control over SOEs, without its interfer-
ence in the enterprises' efficient use of their assets.
This author would not contest the argument of these scholars that the state
under the trust retains rights to decide on the creation and goals of the enterprise,
that is, exercises some control over the effective use and preservation of the enter-
prise's property. This author also agrees that the state, as a settlor-beneficiary, is
entitled to profits from the operation of the enterprise. 98 However, it seems that
under a trust model, the state will not preserve, but instead will lose all its sub-
stantial powers over the management of the enterprises. In this regard, this author
shares the concern of Russian economists who oppose the introduction of the trust
model into the management of SOEs. t99 For instance, some Russian scholars pre-
dict that the trust will bring "sensational lawsuits regarding fraud of the
population and quiet gratuitous dispensation of state property for pay offs and
bribes, up to the full exhaustion of the property!"
Because of the trust's dual character (property and contract), it might provide
the management (as trustees) with a certain autonomy while assuring the state (as
settlor-beneficiary) of some control over the enterprises' activity.2D Suppose that
196. Note, Russian Property Law Privatization and the Right of "Full Economic Control" 107 HARV.
L.REV. 1044, 1052-54 (1994).
197. The rights of operative management and full economic control have been applied by Soviet and
Russian civil law to the state enterprises. These rights provided the managers and labor collectives of state
enterprises with broad discretionary powers regarding operation of their companies. However, in this author's
view, these rights were not effective because the state kept the enterprises on soft budget constraints which
eliminated any incentives of managers to manage effectively their companies.
198. See Russian Property Law, supra note 196, at 1054.
199. Russian scholars proposed using the trust as a method of managing the statejoint-stock companies
by giving the state's shares in trust to managers of these enterprises. This system was called the "contract
system." because it was supposed that the manager had to enter into the "contract of commercial management"
with the state. See, e.g., B. Koshkln & J. Sichev, Konzeptual'nie osnovi kommersializasii gosudarstvennich
predprijatii na haze konkursa predprinlmatel'skich proektov (kontractnaja sistema predprinimatelstva), 3
EKON. IZH. 7 (1994).
200. Y. Mirkina & L Medina, Doverat' ii trastu? 5 EKON. I ZH. 17 (1994).
201. A trust, similar to operative management and full economic control, has a dual character: it
embraces the elements of both property rights and obligatory relations. That is why the "trust" is defined in
American common law as both the property right and the obligation. Some courts describe trust as "aproperty
right held by one party for the use of another." Keplinger v. Keplinger, 113 N.E 292, 293 (Ind. 1916). Some
legal scholars interpret trust as "an obligation imposed, either expressly or by implication of law, whereby the
obligor is bound to deal with property over which he has control for the benefit of certain persons, of whom
he may enforce the obligation." Hart, What is a Trust? 15 L. Q. REv. 301, cited in Bogert, LAW oFTRusTS 1
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the state as a settlor creates a trust and determines its basic purpose, such as using
the property for the benefit of the state, or, the community as a whole.m Further
suppose that the state defines the goals of an enterprise in the enterprise's charter
or bylaws. Finally, presume that the state has an established legal mechanism to
effectuate its right to control the effective use and preservation of the enterprise's
property. The question is whether the trust will further a desirable public goal of
attaining harmony between the management (and labor collectives) of SQEs (as
trustees) and the state (as a settlor-beneficiary) according to the general principles
of trust law.
First, after establishing the trust, the state loses all practical means of
controlling the enterprise. After taking possession, the trustees have a duty to
utilize the trust corpus for the purpose of producing income, either by continuing
to hold the productive assets given to them by the settlor, or by investing the
unproductive assets in order to earn a return. 2 Thus, the trustees have the power
to dispose of the property belonging to the state by selling, exchanging, mortgag-
ing, or leasing the trust corpus.204 As a general rule, the trustees' investment
decisions may be controlled by: (1) directions of the settlor in the trust document
(in our case the bylaws of an enterprise); (2) orders of the court of chancery (e.g.,
an arbitration court); (3) consent of the beneficiary to investments; and (4)
statute0 5 However, the settlor's direction in the trust document as the
exploitation of the trust corpus cannot possibly predict all future economic
changes and market demands; thus, such instructions inevitably become obstacles
to developing a means of production and an entrepreneurial initiative. Beyond
(West ed. 1973). Apparently, this dual character of trust relations was not noticed by Russian scholars. When
the discussions regarding the inculcation of the trust into the civil law system of Russia and other countries of
continental law were under way, scholars separated into two groups. The representatives of the first group
reconciled themselves with the idea of splintered ownership and they urged considering the institution of trust
as a system of property relations. They called trust "doveritel'naja sobstvennost," or fiduciary property. As a
result, they proposed adopting the Anglo-American model of trust as is, without any changes or modifications.
The second group of scholars considered the trust as obligatory relations, which are based on a contract
between the parties which gives rise to their reciprocal duties and rights. They called the trust "doveritel'noe
upravlenie," or fiduciary management, and suggested modifying the common law trust so that it would fit in
the civil law system. See Trust neobichajno udoben, 5 EKON. I Zi. 16 (1994) (interviewing vice-chief of GKI,
P. Mostovoi).
202. Under U.S. law, a charitable trust can be created for the benefit of unascertainable beneficiaries.
See Bogert, supra note 179, at 206. However, in our case, the vagueness and uncertainty of what constitutes
the benefit to the public would make such an arrangement only more complicated. Shall we consider the benefit
as accruing to the local community, where the enterprise is located, or to all citizens of the country? Shall we
take into account the federal structure of the country? Who will decide what is a benefit to the public? Do we
substitute a manager's business judgment with the second guessing of a judge or a state arbiter? Is the
administration of such a trust practicable? Furthermore, it is not clear who will police the trustee's activity, if
the trust is created for the benefit of the whole people. It seems that we might return to the point from where
we started: to the property of no one, with no one's responsibility.
203. Bogert, supra note 179, § 101.
204. Bogert, supra note 179, §§ 133, 136, 139.
205. Bogert, supra note 179, § 102.
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instructions in the trust document, trustees are not under any duty to obey the
requests or instructions of a beneficiary as to the use of the trust corpus and the
investment of the trust fund.2 Consent of the beneficiary may only shield the
trustees from liability for improper investment. However, an absence of consent
does not preclude the trustees from exercising their given discretion. The very
purpose of the trust, according to Bogert, "is to give the beneficiary the benefits
of the property without placing upon them the burdens of management.'2°7
Indeed, if the government shifts its "burden of management" of SOEs to the
managers of these enterprises, it must transfer to them its powers to control as
well.
The effectuation of duties by court order is a very costly and impractical
procedure?'m After all, judges are not in a position to second guess what is in the
best interest of the public regarding the operation of a large industrial enterprise
having thousands of employees and intensive capital investments. Judges are not
prepared to take this burden from the state. Certainly, they are less informed
about the internal affairs of the enterprise (i.e., its productive cycle, accounting
situation, human resources and economic potential) than are the managers of the
enterprise.
Furthermore, trustees have a duty to the beneficiary to administer the affairs
of the trust in the interests of the beneficiary alone, and to exclude from con-
sideration their own advantage or the welfare of a third party.209 Yet, this
obligation of loyalty in the trust is quite contrary to the right of full economic
control, since the right of full economic control enables labor collectives to be
more autonomous in their decision-making.
Moreover, the trustees' potential liability for bad management precludes the
taking of reasonable entrepreneurial risks. In pursuing fast and substantial rates
of return, the managers might sell the enterprise and invest the proceeds into
something else, while leaving thousands of former employees out in the cold. One
must doubt that whether court could hold that such a decision would be for the
benefit of the state. After all, what is the benefit of the state? Does it include only
the notion of profit-maximizing or some abstract public benefit? Will the
managers-trustees care about such public ills as ecological contanination and
unemployment? Does unemployment benefit a society?
Finally, the trust creates an ineradicable conflict between managers and labor.
Workers would have no rights at all within their own enterprises and sometimes
206. Bogert, supra note 179, §102. See also, THELAwoFTHERussIANFEDERAION ONTRUST, art. 18,
VEsTNtKVIGs. ARBAGNOGO SUDA ROSSIIsKOIFEDRAZl, No. 4 (1994).
207. Bogart, supra note 179, § 102.
208. In a few U.S. states, trustees had been required by statute to submit all proposed investments to the
court for approval, but this statutory requirement has been abandoned. See Bogert, supra note 179, §102.
209. See Bogart, supra note 179, at § 95. See also THELAW ONTRUsToFTHERUSSiANFEDERtArToN,
supra note 206, art. 3.
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they would even be subjected to arbitrary and capricious decisions on the part of
the managers. Also, the state would not have any control over the managers. In
this situation, the traditional public corporation seems to be a step ahead.
Russian scholars propose selecting managers from among contenders for
trustees' positions through a competition (konkurs) of strategic plans elaborated
by the contenders for developing the enterprise. It would be necessary to include
plans for technical re-equipment and structural reorganization of the production
process, extending the output of production and improving its quality, cutting pro-
duction costs and increasing profitability.210 However, while these pre-contractual
negotiations provide some guarantees of selecting good projects, they do not
secure the selection of good managers. That is why the dream of these Russian
scholars that the competition of entrepreneurial projects will reduce the risk of
losing control over an enterprise seems to be utopian.2 ' Besides, even if reliable
and trustworthy managers are selected, the trust is not flexible enough to take into
account all possible future socio-economic changes, which would inevitably
restrict the managers' entrepreneurial initiative.
Thus, the common law trust system will not resolve the problems involved
in monitoring SOEs. In the social-economic conditions of post-socialist countries
it might only promote the flourishing of corruption and stratify the once equal
society. Moreover, the state will not accomplish its goals of preserving SOEs
through the mechanism of trust. The trust would provide the managers with
practically unlimited power, while restricting the state's remedies to interference
with the decision-making process of managers. However, if one aspect of trust is
simply the fragmentation of ownership, the second distinct aspect of it is the idea
of vague, open-ended duties of loyalty. As such, the trust model may be used for
the purpose of establishing fiduciary duties of managers.
Following the common law approach, Russian legislators proclaimed that
directors of public corporations "shall have the duty to display loyalty to the
Company," which includes the obligations to: (1) disclose their financial interest
or other conflicts of interests in a prospective transaction with the corporation; (2)
not influence the members of the board with respect to such transactions; (3) not
invade the company's business opportunities; and (4) "fulfill their official duties
210. See, e.g., Koshkin, supra note 199, at7.
211. The debates about the process of selection of managers of state enterprises have a long history. In
the 1920s, in order to eliminate the roots of bureaucratization, Lenin suggested organizing the Workers-
Peasants Inspection, functions of which would have included control over potential abuses and self-dealing
of the people's representatives. Lenin wrote that in order to create such an inspection....
we need the best elements of our social system, that is, first of all, the front-rank workers, secondly, the
highly educated, on whom we can rely upon to not take anything on trust and who would not say a word
against their consciousness-we need them not to be afraid of confessing any difficulty and not to be
afraid of any struggle necessary to the achievement of their goal.
Lenin, Luchshe menishe da luchshe [BenerLess, But Beter], in 45 POLNOESOBRANIE SOCNEN 1389,391-92
(5th ed.) (translated by this author); see also Lenin, Kak nam reorganizovat' Rabkrin [How We Should
Reorganize RABKRIN (the Workers-Peasants Inspection)], in 45 POLNOE SOB RANtE SoCtti, 383-88.
1995/Role of the State in Monitoring Large Firms in Russia
in good faith, and in the manner which they believe to be best for the company's
interest."212 This is the main contribution of the common law trust to the develop-
ment of Russian corporate and agency law.
V. CONCLUSION
This essay has argued that the main purpose of privatization is to transform
the monitoring role of the state from one of daily supervision of SOEs to one in
which the state participates in the equity of privatized enterprises. In summary,
there are three major conclusions which can be drawn from the foregoing
discussion.
First, in order to reduce the possibilities of managerial abuses, corruption and
the stratification of society, it is conceivable that the Russian government will
want to retain some type of temporary control over privatized enterprises. In order
to retain such control, the state would not necessarily have to maintain full owner-
ship of companies. Instead, the state can accomplish its goals through various
legal mechanisms, such as mixed-ownership companies, the golden share, or a
combination of both. The technique of the golden share might be used when
government wants to preserve control over important strategic decisions re-
garding the functioning of companies. In the highly distorted capital markets of
Russia, the utilization of such a technique might preserve the smooth pace of eco-
nomic and political reforms in the country. However, if the government wishes
to participate in the profit of an enterprise, it should maintain some equity in the
company.
Second, as an ordinary shareholder, the state should owe conventional
fiduciary duties to other shareholders. Otherwise, the process of privatization does
not make any sense. The content and legal form of fiduciary duties depends on
the government's holding in the company. If the state retains the golden share, the
government's duty of loyalty to shareholders can be very loose and might be
limited only to the requirement that the state's actions be rationally related to
serve legitimate state objectives. But when the government acts exclusively in a
shareholder's capacity, it should bear the same fiduciary duties as do majority
shareholders towards minority shareholders in a conventional public corporation.
Third, due to an absence of the concept of an open-ended duty of loyalty in
civil law, Russian legislators tend to appeal to the experience of the U.S. common
law system of trust and fiduciary duties. Yet, not every legal institute of common
law may fit into the Russian civil law system. Moreover, the unique social
position of managers and labor collectives after the post-socialist voucher and
employee privatization in Russia makes the issue of corporate control even more
212. See THE MODEL STATEITE OF PUBL1CLY-HELD JOINT-STOCK COMPANY, art. 7, RF Edict No. 721,
supra nots 151.
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complicated. Arguably, many pro-manager provisions of U.S. corporate law can-
not be effectively applied in Russia at the present time. Periods of transition
demand transitional laws.
The problems of developing the concept of corporate governance in Russia
are more than mere theoretical problems. Today, due to the unique opportunities
of the Russian capital markets, many U.S. and Western financial companies are
looking forward to being involved in business there. More and more Russian
privatized companies try to sell their securities abroad. However, foreign
investors are reluctant to make investments in Russian companies because of the
uncertainties of the custody and registration systems of Russian securities.
Moreover, the employee ownership of the Russian enterprises, the informational
monopoly of the corporate insiders and the equity stake of the Russian
government do not add to the credibility of Russian securities on the world capital
market. Nonetheless, the Russian capital market is far from being completely
ignored by foreign investors, although the uncertainty regarding its operation still
remains. Thus, one of the practical purposes of this paper is to assist the inter-
national lawyer to understand the reality of the Russian concept of corporate
governance and the problems that are faced by the Russian legislators today. This
author hopes that the analysis of these problems helps to predict the future of the
Russian corporate law.
